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PRIVACY, MASS INTRUSION, AND THE MODERN DATA
BREACH
Jon L. Mills* & Kelsey Harclerode**
Abstract
Massive data breaches have practically become a daily occurrence. 
These breaches reveal intrusive private information about individuals, as 
well as priceless corporate secrets. Ashley Madison’s breach ruined lives 
and resulted in suicides. The HSBC breach, accomplished by one of their 
own, revealed valuable commercial information about the bank and 
personal information about HSBC customers. The employee responsible 
for the breach has since been convicted of aggravated personal espionage,
while third-party news outlets have been free to republish the hacked 
information. 
Some information disclosed in data breaches can serve a public 
purpose. The Snowden disclosures, for example, revealed sensitive 
government information and were also crucial to public policy debate, a
significant amount of disclosed information is destructive to individuals 
and companies alike, and often has little, if any, public value.
The conflict between publicly important disclosures and disturbing 
private intrusions creates a direct confrontation between freedom of 
expression and privacy. A full analysis of this confrontation requires 
assessment of the specific circumstances of breach—from the 
vulnerabilities present beforehand to the aftermath when the media, 
companies, and individuals all must cope with the information exposed.
This analysis begins by evaluating the importance of information in 
modern society. Big data is now an inescapable part of our culture. A data 
breach may contain intimate details about medical conditions or national 
security secrets. The disclosure of either has its own kind of devastating 
effect. Examples of the impact of a mass data breach include the hacking 
of Target Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Home Depot, Inc., Sony Corporation,
Anthem Inc., HSBC Private Bank (Suisse), SA, and 
AshleyMadison.com. A dissection of these breaches reveals a common 
theme—the ineffectual legal system, which provides little protection or 
remedy for any party involved. Several factors—including the anonymity 
of hackers, outdated legal remedies, and free speech protections for third-
party publishers—together create an uncertain and uncharted legal 
landscape. 
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After evaluating the available statutory and common law remedies, 
this Article posits that reinvigorated private causes of action can be a 
starting point for developing stronger legal remedies for those damaged 
in a breach. The right facts and legal arguments can create new remedies 
out of existing legal doctrines. Further, public values on protecting 
privacy are in flux. More protective policies in the European Union
demonstrate that privacy and free expression can coexist. Some EU
policies may provide examples of legislative options. Corporate entities 
and individuals are at risk and are suffering real harm in a world with 
daily data breaches and ineffective laws. The need for new perspectives 
is urgent.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in an increasingly intrusive world. Even when we share our 
data with trustworthy entities, our privacy is still at risk due to the 
enhanced possibility of data hacks and breaches. Modern data breaches 
exist at the intersection of technology, modern culture, and human frailty.
The rate of change is rapid and not easily predictable. Policy makers from 
almost every sector and level of government are trying to keep up with 
improving technology and more skilled hackers. Beyond general tensions 
between rapidly developing technology and slow-moving laws, data 
breaches present a direct confrontation between two of society’s most 
fundamental of rights: the freedom of expression and the right to privacy.
The man behind the largest data breach in the financial sector’s 
history, Hervé Falciani, is hailed as a whistleblower by some and 
regarded as a thief by others. His tale of international intrigue highlights 
the drama and massive scope of the modern data breach. 
3
Mills and Harclerode: Privacy, Mass Intrusion and the Modern Data Breach
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
774 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
Falciani, a computer analyst for HSBC Private Bank Suisse, obtained 
and leaked upwards of 30,000 company files that contained information 
regarding $120 billion in assets from more than 100,000 clients across 
203 countries.1 The leak exposed client lists, irregularities in financial 
patterns, as well as the private financial information of thousands of 
customers.2 After fleeing Switzerland, Falciani shared his information 
with French officials and the media. A French newspaper passed it along 
to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) to 
assist in organizing and disseminating the data.3 Meanwhile, Falciani was 
arrested in Geneva, fled to France, and was ultimately detained in Spain.4
He now lives as a fugitive in France.5 Though his leak allowed several 
countries to recover billions of dollars in back taxes, Falciani reportedly 
has not received any payment for his disclosures.6 Still, the Swiss 
government believes Falciani was unjustly enriched by his actions and a 
Swiss court agreed.7 Falciani was convicted of aggravated industrial
espionage and sentenced to five years in jail.8 While Falciani endured 
international legal repercussions for spearheading this leak, the third-
party media sources?mediated by ICIJ?have been free to republish the 
leaked material without legal consequence, including information about 
private individuals.9
When publicly important information is revealed, often private 
information that wounds innocent individuals and corporations is 
exposed as well. The harm done to innocent parties wrapped up in public 
disclosures highlights the need to balance free speech with individual 
privacy rights. The HSBC breach represents just one of the thousands of
                                                                                                                     
1. David Leigh et al., HSBC Files Show How Swiss Bank Helped Clients Dodge Taxes and 
Hide Millions, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/feb/08/hsbc-files-expose-swiss-bank-clients-dodge-taxes-hide-millions; HSBC 
Bank “Helped Clients Dodge Millions in Tax,” BBC (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/business-31248913.
2. Leigh et al., supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Profile: HSBC Whistleblower Herve Falciani, BBC (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31296007.
5. Patrick Radden Keefe, The Bank Robber, NEW YORKER (May 30, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/05/30/herve-falcianis-great-swiss-bank-heist.
6. Bill Whitaker, The Swiss Leaks, CBS NEWS (Feb. 8, 2015), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hsbc-swiss-leaks-investigation-60-minutes.
7. Juliette Garside, HSBC Whistleblower Given Five Years’ Jail over Biggest Leak in 
Banking History, GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/
2015/nov/27/hsbc-whistleblower-jailed-five-years-herve-falciani.
8. Id.
9. Leigh et al., supra note 1.
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massive data breaches that have become everyday headlines.10 Despite 
an elevated frequency of modern data breaches, the law has simply not 
caught up. 
Data breaches present themselves to a corporate general counsel as a 
tornado of legal issues. The loss of data does not result in one or two 
academic doctrinal problems that can be attacked like a law school final 
exam. The issues can include: trademark law, privacy law, First 
Amendment law, insurance law, tort law, negligence, contract law, 
securities law, violations of data security laws of other countries, labor 
law, federal agency data security violations, criminal law, shareholder 
liability, attorney–client privilege, and board liability. This list is not 
exhaustive, and it is impossible to predict the exact combination of legal 
issues that will arise after a particular breach. What is known is that these 
issues must be addressed immediately. A company may face a class 
action lawsuit, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement action, 
a State Attorney General investigation, or all of the above. To ensure 
success, all potential post-breach issues must be addressed as quickly as 
possible. There is a reason general counsel lose sleep over data breaches. 
While this law is evolving and unpredictable, this Article seeks to 
provide a primer on the modern data breach. It would be thoughtless, 
however, to contend that this Article provides a complete primer on the 
issue. In just the time between the Florida Law Review accepting this 
Article and the final edits, our country experienced dramatic 
transformations at the federal level, including at the executive branch and 
two of the most central agencies entrusted with establishing data 
protection standards, and Equifax revealed that a data breach exposed the 
information of 145.5 million Americans. The latter occurred in the final 
weeks of editing. Both of the events reveal the true challenge in 
protecting against and responding to a data breach during an era of 
technological upheaval: the law may never be able to catch up. 
                                                                                                                     
10. See, e.g., Zack Whittaker, 2017’s Biggest Hacks, Leaks, and Data Breaches – So Far,
ZD NET (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/biggest-hacks-leaks-and-data-breaches-
2017/; Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report from Identity Theft 
Resource Center and CyberScout, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 19, 2017), 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches.html; Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the 
Century, FORTUNE (June 25, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part-1/; Andy 
Greenberg, Hack Brief: Yahoo Breach Hits Half a Billion Users, WIRED (Sept. 22, 2016, 12:15 
PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/hack-brief-yahoo-looks-set-confirm-big-old-data-breach/;
Dan Munro, Data Breaches in Healthcare Totaled over 112 Million Records in 2015, FORBES
(Dec. 31, 2015, 9:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-in-
healthcare-total-over-112-million-records-in-2015/#67efbf4b7b07; Robin Sidel, Target to Settle 
Claims over Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/target-reaches-settlement-with-visa-over-2013-data-breach-1439912013; see also infra
Section I.B.
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This Article will explore the legal and social conflicts inherent in 
publicly important disclosures and private intrusions. Part I provides an 
overview of the importance of information as it relates to the modern data 
breach. Part II reviews the most common patterns among these intrusions. 
Part III analyzes the federal and state standards for data security and how 
these standards shape the options for the breached companies and 
exposed individuals. Part IV examines the private causes of action 
available after a breach occurs. Part V compares the data security law in 
the United States with that of the European Union with an emphasis on 
the transition to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 
2018. Finally, Part VI offers suggestions for how corporations and 
individuals can best respond to the current states of data security law. 
I. DATA BREACH IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Chief Justice John Roberts recently wrote, “[A] cell phone search 
would typically expose to the government far more than the most 
exhaustive search of a house.”11 The prospect of a hacker cracking your 
cell phone’s code to retrieve information about your communications, 
medical records, GPS locations, contacts, stored financial records, 
photos, appointments, or Google search history is downright frightening.
Exposing digital data and metadata may provide a fuller and more 
intimate and intrusive invasion of privacy than a walk through your 
bedroom. In light of this new reality, smart phones must receive the same 
constitutional protections that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment 
afforded to the sanctity of the private home.
High-profile government data breaches have acted as a catalyst for 
discourse on data security. In 2013, the Edward Snowden disclosures 
prompted national and international scrutiny of the National Security 
Agency (NSA)’s data collection practices.12 Recognizing the leak’s 
dramatic effect on public dialogue about government intrusion does not 
prevent an equally important discussion about the disclosure’s 
intrusiveness to individuals. Accordingly, the debate over whether 
Snowden should be regarded as a “whistle blower” or a traitor is still 
ongoing.13
In 2016, a group of Russian hackers used a spear phishing attack to 
breach the email account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary 
                                                                                                                     
11. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
12. Snowden’s legacy continues with another NSA data breach reportedly conducted by a
contractor of NSA consulting company, Booz Allen Hamilton. Jo Becker et al., N.S.A. Contractor 
Arrested in Possible New Theft of Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/us/nsa-leak-booz-allen-hamilton.html.
13. See AFTER SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
(Ronald Goldfarb ed., 2015).
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/3
2017] PRIVACY, MASS INTRUSION, AND THE MODERN DATA BREACH 777
Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign.14 This initial intrusion, the original 
publication of the emails on Wikileaks, and the subsequent republication 
of the emails on almost every news site imaginable played a substantial—
but largely immeasurable—role in Donald Trump’s defeat of Hillary 
Clinton in November 2016.15 The Kremlin’s involvement in the 2016 
election and President Trump’s knowledge of such involvement has since 
dominated coverage of his first seven months in office and will likely 
continue to plague his presidency.16
Politically motivated intrusions and leaks are not a new trend. In 1971, 
Daniel Ellsberg leaked portions of the Pentagon Papers to the press.17 One 
year later in 1972, former President Richard Nixon’s aides broke into and 
bugged the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters at the 
Watergate Hotel.18 These disclosures—new and old—demonstrate the 
dramatic impact that data security has on the individual and society at 
large.
When information is stolen or misappropriated, the result is frequently 
characterized as a “data breach.”19 Data can take on many different 
meanings. Sensitive data is generally afforded greater legal protection, 
and includes financial, educational, and medical records, as well as 
personally identifiable information (PII), business information, and 
location data.20 Data can be most easily broken down into two types: 
“metadata” and “content.” Metadata is the information about the content
data.21 For example, the body of an email is the content and the subject 
                                                                                                                     
14. See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, How Hackers Broke into John Podesta and Colin 
Powell’s Gmail Accounts, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 20, 2016, 9:30 AM) 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg7xjb/how-hackers-broke-into-john-podesta-and-
colin-powells-gmail-accounts.
15. See Harry Enten, How Much Did Wikileaks Hurt Hillary Clinton?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Dec. 23, 2016, 5:01 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/wikileaks-hillary-clinton/.
16. See Silvia Amaro, Russia Scandal Could Dog Trump’s Presidency for Years, Political 
Analyst Says, CNBC (July 17, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/17/russia-
scandal-could-dog-trumps-presidency-for-years-political-analyst-says.html.
17. The New York Times published three articles detailing Daniel Ellsberg’s leak of the 
Pentagon Papers before the Nixon administration sought to enjoin The New York Times and The 
Washington Post from publishing information and analysis of the Pentagon Papers. See David W. 
Dunlap, 1971 Supreme Court Allows Publication of Pentagon Papers, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/insider/1971-supreme-court-allows-publication-of-
pentagon-papers.html.
18. See Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats,
WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 1972), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-finds-nixon-aides-
sabotaged-democrats/2012/06/06/gJQAoHIJJV_story.html.
19. Margaret Rouse, Data Breach, TECHTARGET, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/
definition/data-breach (last updated May 2010).
20. For a discussion of federal and state laws that protect sensitive information, see infra
Part III.
21. Metadata Definition, LINUX INFO. PROJECT (Mar. 21, 2006), 
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line, origin, and destination of the email is metadata. Both forms are 
vulnerable to a breach,22 and the information itself carries varying levels 
of intimacy, which may be intensified when aggregated. While the 
content of your medical records may seem more private than the 
corresponding metadata, uncovering a complete log of the appointment 
times of one’s health visits (metadata) is no less of a Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) violation than the exposure 
of the reason for a person’s health visit (content).
Despite the interconnectivity of data and the overarching implications 
of privacy in all aspects of life today, the United States primarily 
compartmentalizes the regulation of data security by each defined 
sector.23 For example, the legal standards for protecting health data are 
different from the standards for protecting education data. Regardless of 
the sector, metadata is often less protected than content under current 
legal doctrine. Courts have traditionally held that while there is an 
expectation of privacy in the content of a telephone call, the metadata 
about that telephone call is not private.24 The common analogy in support 
of this view is that the return address and address on an envelope are not 
considered private while the contents of the envelope are.
This analysis undervalues metadata. Collected in the aggregate or over 
a broad span of time, metadata can reveal as much about a person as 
content.25 Innovative technologies help entities collect massive amounts 
of metadata nearly constantly, while sophisticated analytic tools allow 
detailed evaluations.26 One well known example of metadata collection 
and analysis is the NSA’s bulk data collection and analysis program, 
which has undergone significant legal scrutiny following the Snowden 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.linfo.org/metadata.html.
22. How to Extract Metadata from Websites Using FOCA for Windows, NULL BYTE (May 
28, 2016), http://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-like-pro-extract-metadata-from-
websites-using-foca-for-windows-0155076/.
23. There are more than fifty privacy related federal laws. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6501–05 (2012); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g (2012); The Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2010); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2010).
24. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that metadata pertaining to 
phone numbers dialed was not protected under the Fourth Amendment because it was available 
to the phone company).
25. Joe Coscarelli, Metadata Can Be More Revealing Than Your Actual Conversations,
N.Y. MAG. (June 7, 2013, 1:03 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/metadata-
whats-in-your-phone-records.html.
26. See Sara Schwartz, 9 Ways You’re Being Spied on Every Day, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
3, 2014, 12:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/03/government-surveillance
_n_5084623.html.
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disclosures.27 Judge Richard J. Leon, in a ruling that the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia ultimately reversed for a lack of
standing, aptly commented, “Records that once would have revealed a 
few scattered tiles of information about a person now reveal an entire 
mosaic—a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person's life.”28
The legal system’s slow progression towards recognizing the importance 
of metadata is but one of the many challenges within privacy law.29
A. Corporate Data Breaches
As part of their business model, modern corporations collect, store, 
use, create, and disseminate information constantly—and are thus made 
vulnerable to a third party stealing or misappropriating that information. 
Corporate data can be as routine as an employee’s weekly work schedule, 
or as unique as the formula for Coca Cola. In 2016, documented incidents 
of data breaches reached an all-time record high of 1,093, leaving more 
than 36 million records exposed.30 Based on data through June 2017, one 
estimate suggests that this figure will rise by 37% by the end of 2017.31
Consistent with these numbers, 64% of American adults report having 
experienced their personal data compromised in a breach.32 A
corporation’s public reputation and economic value may be profoundly 
damaged in a breach, as well as the reputations, finances, and personal 
lives of the individuals associated with the breach. When users of the 
                                                                                                                     
27. See Jack Goldsmith, Reflections on NSA Oversight, and a Prediction That NSA 
Authorities (and Oversight, and Transparency) Will Expand, LAWFARE (Aug. 9, 2013, 7:52 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/reflections-nsa-oversight-and-prediction-nsa-authorities-and-
oversight-and-transparency-will-expand; see also Kelsey Harclerode, How USA Freedom 
Impacts Ongoing NSA Litigation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 23, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/06/how-usa-freedom-impacts-ongoing-nsa-litigation.
28. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800 
F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
29. The ability for long-term surveillance and the subsequent collection of data to 
eventually reveal significant insight about one person when put together is often referred to as the 
“mosaic theory.” In United States v. Jones, two concurring opinions signed or joined by five of 
the Supreme Court justices supported the notion that long-term surveillance triggers Fourth 
Amendment protection. 565 U.S. 400, 413–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 429–31
(Alito, J., concurring); see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (using the phrase “mosaic theory” to describe the fact that “[p]rolonged surveillance reveals 
types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does 
repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble”).
30. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS: 2016 END OF YEAR REPORT 2
(2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2016/DataBreachReport_2016.pdf.
31. At Mid-Year, U.S. Data Breaches Increase at Record Pace, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE 
CTR. (July 18, 2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/Press-Releases/2017-mid-year-data-breach-
report-press-release.
32. Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 
26, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/.
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cheating-enabling website Ashley Madison were exposed through a leak, 
many marriages were dissolved, public figures ridiculed, and, tragically,
multiple people committed suicide.33 Clearly, the real-life implications of 
a data breach can be severe, and the harms can extend beyond the 
immediate consequences of the thief’s initial exposure. 
B. Examples of Corporate Data Breaches
The following cases across different industries demonstrate the 
importance of data security, the need for concrete remedies for 
individuals harmed in a data breach, and the general security patterns that 
emerge throughout the life cycle of data management. 
1. Target 
Because Target failed to identify the lax security of a subcontractor,
the company became the victim of a sophisticated hacking attack that left 
40 million customers’ debit and credit cards exposed and an additional 
70 million customers’ nonfinancial personal information stolen.34 In the 
aftermath, Target’s CEO resigned, the company settled a massive 
consumer class action lawsuit for $18.5 million,35 and the company lost 
approximately $148 million due to a drastic decline in consumer trust.36
Target also agreed to pay $39.4 million to the banks and credit unions 
that sued Target for the costs incurred to reimburse fraudulent charges 
and issue new credit and debit cards to Target’s consumers.37
2. Yahoo!
In September of 2016, Yahoo, the internet search engine, mail 
provider, and content platform, revealed that the company had 
                                                                                                                     
33. Sara Malm, Two Suicides Are Linked to Ashley Madison Leak: Texas Police Chief Takes 
His Own Life Just Days After His Email Is Leaked in Cheating Website Hack, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 
24, 2015, 5:08 PM),  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3208907/The-Ashley-Madison-
suicide-Texas-police-chief-takes-life-just-days-email-leaked-cheating-website-hack.html; Laurie 
Segall, Pastor Outed on Ashley Madison Commits Suicide, CNN MONEY (Sept. 8, 2015, 7:10 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/08/technology/ashley-madison-suicide/.
34. Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/target-security-
breach-settlement.html.
35. Id.
36. Samantha Sharf, Target Shares Tumble as Retailer Reveals Cost of Data Breach,
FORBES (Aug. 5, 2014, 9:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2014/08/05/target-
shares-tumble-as-retailer-reveals-cost-of-data-breach. 
37. Jonathan Stempel & Nandita Bose, Target in $39.4 Million Settlement with Banks 
Over Data Breach, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2015, 9:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-target-
breach-settlement/target-in-39-4-million-settlement-with-banks-over-data-breach-idUSKB
N0TL20Y20151203.
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experienced a massive breach two years prior in which 500 million users’ 
PII, encrypted passwords, and in some cases security questions were 
hacked by a “state-sponsored actor.”38 Just three months later, the 
company disclosed a separate, and even greater, hack that compromised 
the accounts of more than 1 billion users.39 As a result of the double 
breaches, Yahoo lost profits in its pending acquisition deal with Verizon. 
In March of 2017, the U.S. Justice Department indicted two Russian spies
and two criminal hackers on charges of hacking, wire fraud, trade secret 
theft and economic espionage in connection to the earlier Yahoo breach.40
The Justice Department’s indictment of foreign cybercriminals is 
consistent with U.S. government’s recent strategy of issuing economic 
sanctions against foreign governments in the aftermath of cyber attacks, 
as seen against North Korea in the Sony case,41 and Russian officials after 
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.42
3. Home Depot 
In 2014, hackers deployed malware that infected the Home Depot 
payment systems, and 56 million customers’ credit cards were exposed.43
It reportedly took five months for the company to become aware of the 
attack.44 Following the breach, Home Depot faced a daunting class action 
lawsuit that ultimately led to a $19.5 million settlement.45
4. Sony Pictures and Entertainment
In November 2014, Sony, the global entertainment company, 
experienced a sweeping data breach that revealed a massive amount of
intellectual property and sensitive personal information.46 In the weeks
                                                                                                                     
38. Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/technology/yahoo-hackers.html.
39. Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts Were Hacked, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html.
40. Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department Charges Russian Spies and Criminal Hackers in 
Yahoo Intrusion, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/justice-department-charging-russian-spies-and-criminal-hackers-for-yahoo-intrusion/
2017/03/15/64b98e32-0911-11e7-93dc-00f9bdd74ed1_story.html?utm_term=.4169dbd11053.
41. See discussion infra Subsection I.B.4. 
42. See Nakashima, supra note 40.
43. Melvin Blackman, Home Depot: 56 Million Cards Exposed in Breach, CNN (Sept. 18, 
2014, 5:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/18/technology/security/home-depot-hack/.
44. Id.
45. Jonathan Stempel, Home Depot Settles Consumer Lawsuit over Big 2014 Data Breach,
REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2016, 2:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-home-depot-breach-
settlement-idUSKCN0WA24Z.
46. See Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hack-
explained/.
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following the public disclosure of the breach on November 24, the 
hackers released 38 million files in eight individual batches.47 These files 
included salacious content, such as emails between executives and 
celebrities.48 The leaked intellectual property included unreleased movies 
and unfinished manuscripts.49 The estimated twenty-five gigabytes of 
sensitive and/or confidential employee data released included passwords, 
private keys, personal health information, social security numbers, home 
addresses, bank account information, workers compensation details, 
performance reviews, retirement plan information, and criminal 
background checks.50 Sparking international intrigue and igniting debates 
concerning the intersection of national security and the First Amendment, 
many believe that North Korea perpetrated the breach to deter the release 
of The Interview, a comedic film that featured an assassination of North 
Korea’s leader.51 Following the breach, Sony fired several executives and 
also agreed to pay $2–4.5 million to settle a class action lawsuit brought 
by employees whose personal records were exposed in the breach.52
5. Anthem Health Insurance
The healthcare sector has been the target of several massive hacks, a 
trend that is predicted to continue due to the high value of personal 
medical information.53 In 2015, questionable internal storage encryption 
led to the theft of nearly 80 million personal records from Anthem, a large 
medical insurance company.54 The hackers targeted PII like social 
security numbers, email addresses, and birthdays.55 The fifty plus class 
actions suits filed against Anthem also raised concerns over potential 
                                                                                                                     
47. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 10.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. David E. Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before 
Sony Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/
world/asia/nsa-tapped-into-north-korean-networks-before-sony-attack-officials-say.html?_r=0.
52. Jody Godoy, Sony to Pay up to $4.5M to Settle Employee’s Breach Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 
20, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/716417/sony-to-pay-up-to-4-5m-to-settle-
employees-breach-suit.
53. 2017 Data Breach Industry Forecast, EXPERIAN (2017), http://www.experian.com/ 
assets/data-breach/white-papers/2017-experian-data-breach-industry-forecast.pdf.
54. Bruce Japsen, Hackers Stole Data on 80 Million Anthem Customers. Why Wasn't 
It Encrypted?, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2015, 8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
brucejapsen/2015/02/06/anthem-didnt-encrypt-personal-data-and-privacy-laws-dont-require-it/.
55. Id.
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HIPAA violations since the breach included medical IDs.56 In 2017, 
Anthem settled the consumer claims for $115 million.57
6. HSBC Finance Corporation
This hack of a global bank by an employee revealed intimate financial 
information about thousands of the bank’s international clients, some of 
whom were notable business leaders and public figures.58 Not only did 
this hack bring HSBC data security practices under scrutiny, but several 
of the individual customers are now under criminal investigation for 
information brought to light in the disclosure.59
7. Ashley Madison
An anonymous hacker group?self-named The Impact 
Team?hacked into the online cheating website and threatened to release 
the stolen information if the owners did not permanently shut down the 
site.60 When the website owners did not meet their demands, the hackers 
uploaded around thirty gigabytes of stolen data onto the dark web.61 This 
data dump exposed the personal account information of the site’s users, 
as well as maps of the company’s internal servers, financial data, and 
employee salary information.62 Thus far, two suicides have been linked 
to the hack,63 the CEO has resigned,64 and exposed users have filed a 
$576 million class action suit against the owners of Ashley Madison.65
                                                                                                                     
56. Joseph Conn, Legal Liabilities in Recent Data Breach Extend Far Beyond Anthem,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150223/
NEWS/302239977/legal-liabilities-in-recent-data-breach-extend-far-beyond-anthem.
57. Pamela A. Maclean, Anthem Agrees to $115 Million Settlement Over Data Breach,
BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-
23/anthem-reaches-115-mln-settlement-in-massive-data-breach-case.
58. See David Leigh et al., HSBC Files: Why the Public Should Know of Swiss Bank’s 
Pattern of Misconduct, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/feb/08/hsbc-files-public-right-to-know-swiss-operation-leaked-data.
59. Id.
60. Brian Krebs, Online Cheating Site AshleyMadison Hacked, KREBS ON SECURITY (July 
15, 2015), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/07/online-cheating-site-ashleymadison-hacked/.
61. Kim Zetter, Ashley Madison Hackers Release an Even Bigger Batch of Data, WIRED
(Aug. 20, 2015, 3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/ashley-madison-hackers-release-
even-bigger-batch-data/.
62. Krebs, supra note 60.
63. Chris Baraniuk, Ashley Madison: ‘Suicides’ over Website Hack, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34044506.
64. Kim Zetter, Ashley Madison CEO Resigns in Wake of Hack, News of Affairs, WIRED
(Aug. 28, 2015, 11:35 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/ashley-madison-ceo-resigns-wake-
hack-news-affairs/.
65. Ashley Madison Faces Huge Class-Action Lawsuit, BBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34032760.
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However, those exposed have faced several hurdles during the litigation 
process. The Missouri federal district judge presiding over the multi-
district litigation ordered the class representatives to be publicly 
identified66 and prohibited the plaintiffs from referencing stolen 
documents in their consolidated complaint.67 Despite these limitations, in 
2017, Ashley Madison reached a settlement deal with consumers totaling 
$11.2 million, in addition to the company’s $1.6 million fine from the 
FTC.68 Affected consumers can claim up to $2,000 to cover costs of 
identity theft. 
While each of these data breaches have different facts, the common 
element was devastation to both individuals and to the breached entity. 
In many instances, the business is left just as exposed as the individuals.
What remains constant is that neither have adequate recourse. 
C. Data Breach Victims: Where Are the Remedies?
The overarching theme of these data breaches is the ineffectiveness of 
the legal system to redress wrongs in a timely or complete fashion. Both 
the hacked businesses and victimized individuals are left frustrated and
wondering?where are the remedies? Breaches are akin to thefts of 
valuable information or personal property, and yet victims lack a clear 
pathway to legal redress. Hackers are most often anonymous or difficult 
to hold accountable. Even more frustrating is the inability to stop the 
republication of the hacked personal information. After the hacker’s work 
is done, the damage is furthered by bloggers, the media, and others, who 
copy, republish, and comment on the stolen data.69 In fact, hackers 
generally view broad publication of the data by the media after the breach 
as an integral component of their plan to harm the target of the breach.
Principals of free speech and free press protect the republication of 
hacked data, leaving little opportunity for a data subject to seek relief 
once stolen data has been made available to the media.70
                                                                                                                     
66. Brandon Lowrey, Ashley Madison Class Reps Can’t Hide Names in Hack MDL,
LAW360 (Apr. 6, 2016, 10:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/781507/ashley-madison-
class-reps-can-t-hide-names-in-hack-mdl.
67. Steven Trader, Ashley Madison Users Blocked from Citing Leaked Docs, LAW360 (May 
2, 2016, 3:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/791195/ashley-madison-users-blocked-
from-citing-leaked-docs.
68. David Kravets, Lawyers Score Big in Settlement for Ashley Madison Cheating Site Data 
Breach, ARS TECHNICA (July 17, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/07/sssshhh-claim-your-19-from-ashley-madison-class-action-settlement/.
69. The Legality of Publishing Hacked E-mails, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
http://www.cjr.org/the_observatory/the_legality_of_publishing_hac.php (last visited Jan. 19, 
2017). 
70. WikiLeaks published data that revealed a person’s sexual status, and also identified 
underage victims of sexual assault. This sensitive information was later widely republished by 
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Legal remedies for commonplace wrongs such as a home invasion or 
physical theft of personal property are by comparison adequate and 
predictable. Consider the theft of a laptop versus the theft of information 
inside the laptop. If that laptop is found even after it has been sold or 
exchanged, the owner gets the tangible laptop back. If the information on 
the laptop is opened and disclosed, that personal data may be irretrievable
and damage may continue to be inflicted regardless of a retrieval.
Whether it is a jewel thief or a data thief, the law should have a defined 
toolbox to protect societal values and ownership interests. The broad 
categories of legal remedies include criminal penalties, civil damages, or 
injunctions to prevent harm. Yet despite multiple legal approaches 
available, remedies for data breach victims are not reliably effective. For 
both individuals and corporations, the remedies for data breaches seem 
both limited and limitless.
II. EVALUATING A BREACH
The first steps in evaluating the post-breach legal remedies and 
options are evaluations of A) who is responsible for the unauthorized 
disclosure, and B) how did the breach occur. The answers to these 
deceptively simple questions dictate the immediate response and define 
options for moving forward.
A. Who Is the Intruder?
Not all online intruders hide behind their computer screens. Some 
publicly celebrate their breach. There are four basic categories of 
potential intruders: the whistleblower, the insider, the hacker, and the 
republisher. 
1. The Whistleblower
A whistleblower obtains and discloses data to expose some degree of 
misconduct.71 Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, federal 
employees are generally protected if they reasonably believed that the 
disclosure would reveal “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation”72
or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, 
or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”73 There 
                                                                                                                     
third parties. Raphael Satter & Maggie Michael, Private Lives Are Exposed as WikiLeaks Spills 
Its Secrets, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 23, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
b70da83fd111496dbdf015acbb7987fb/private-lives-are-exposed-wikileaks-spills-its-secrets.
71. What Is a Whistleblower?, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT,
https://www.whistleblower.org/whatwhistleblower (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) (2012).
73. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii). 
15
Mills and Harclerode: Privacy, Mass Intrusion and the Modern Data Breach
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
786 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
are additional restrictions on what types of information can be disclosed 
to the press or public.74 Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden are both 
lauded as whistleblowers.75 Congress has further extended protection to 
corporate whistleblowers who reasonably believe that their disclosure 
reveals corporate fraud or other violations of federal or state financial 
regulations.76
2. The Insider
“Insider” data breaches can be committed by a well-intentioned 
whistleblower or by an employee who uses internal data with the intent
to harm the company or for any other unauthorized purpose. One example 
is a Walgreen pharmacist’s disclosure of prescription records to her 
husband with the motivation to harm a woman she suspected had shared 
a sexually transmitted disease with her husband.77 The result was a $1.4 
million verdict against Walgreens for negligent supervision.78 Insider 
breaches can be inadvertent or negligent. In fact, internal actors were 
responsible for 25% of breaches in 2016, and 14% of all 2016 breaches 
were due to employee error.79 The image of the highly trained hacker or 
hackers sitting in a dimly lit room with multiple screens is not always 
accurate. Often the breach is simply caused by an angry employee or a 
negligent subcontractor, however, sometimes it can be an act of a
malicious and sophisticated hacker. 
3. The Hacker
There are a wide variety of techniques to hack databases—some 
technical and some based on human frailty. Intrusions committed by 
                                                                                                                     
74. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A)-(B); see generally Nick Schwellenbach, Survivor’s Guide to Being 
a Successful Whistleblower in the Federal Government, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/37994/survivors-guide-successful-whistleblower-federal-
government/.
75. Ellsberg and Snowden’s background and acts are often pitted against one another. See, 
e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Daniel Ellsberg, Edward Snowden, and the Modern Whistle-Blower,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/19/daniel-
ellsberg-edward-snowden-and-the-modern-whistle-blower.
76. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (to be codified in various sections of the U.S. Code); Sarbanes Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
77. Andrew Scurria, Walgreen Pharmacy Customer Scores $1.4M Privacy Verdict,
LAW360 (July 29, 2013, 7:08 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/460788/walgreen-pharmacy-
customer-scores-1-4m-privacy-verdict.
78. Id.
79. See VERIZON, 2017 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2 (2017), 
https://www.knowbe4.com/hubfs/rp_DBIR_2017_Report_execsummary_en_xg.pdf.
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criminal hackers include point-of-sale hacks, web-app attacks, physical 
theft, crimeware, spear phishing, brute-force attacks on encryption, card 
skimmers, and cyber espionage.80 The tools of this trade may include 
exhaustive preparation and extensive knowledge of the dark web. There 
are also hackers that focus on human frailty. The story of the hacker that 
gains access because an employee downloaded malware that the hacker 
baited the employee into downloading is well known.81 The criminal 
hacker makes victims out of unsuspecting consumers and the company 
as well. Criminal hacks comprised the majority (62%) of data disclosures 
in 2016.82 This criminal hacker is unambiguously motivated to harm a 
target, expose a truth, benefit herself personally, or in the case of 
corporate espionage, benefit or harm a competitor.83
4. The Republisher
A republisher is a type of intruder that is often overlooked despite their 
ability to inflict substantial damage with one simple post. A republisher 
is an entity, such as a curious individual on social media, a blog, or a 
major media outlet, that publicly shares leaked data after a breach.84
Hackers may count on republishers to disseminate stolen data once 
leaked, or may even provide information directly to media outlets with 
the expectation that the media will publish the data. By reaching a broad 
audience, a republisher may cause as much?or more?damage than the 
hacker who initially stole the information.85 There is little legal authority 
                                                                                                                     
80. VERIZON, 2014 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 16, 20, 27, 32, 35, 43 (2014),
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_Verizon-DBIR-2014_en_xg.pdf.
81. Peter Schablik & Scott M. Higgins, The People Factor in Cyber Breach, FAST 
COMPANY (Oct. 14, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.fastcompany.com/3064490/growth-notes/the-
people-factor-in-cyber-breach.
82. See VERIZON, supra note 79, at 2.
83. Not all hackers are nefariously motivated. Security researchers, often labeled as white 
hat hackers, will intrude systems to expose vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, the line between 
“criminal hackers” and “white hat hackers” is ambiguous, which puts white hat hackers at risk of 
criminal culpability. For example, in August 2017, the FBI arrested Marcus Hutchins on suspicion 
that the security researcher developed and/or sold the malware strain Kronos. Hutchins is known 
for stopping the spread of the WannaCry ransomware and is seen as a white hat hacker by most 
in the security community. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Who Is Marcus Hutchins, KREBS ON SECURITY 
(Sept. 5, 2017, 6:50 AM), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/09/who-is-marcus-hutchins/.
84. Jon Mills et al., Ashley Madison—Intrusion and the Family, UF L. FAC. BLOGS,
https://facultyblogs.law.ufl.edu/ashleymadisonintrusionandthefamily/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017). 
85. While “revenge porn” is commonly not treated as a data breach, the republication of 
nonconsensual intimate media is a frustrating example of the horrendous amount of damage that 
can occur after an initial data intrusion. See generally Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” 
Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 2017) (detailing the 
harms of revenge porn and discussing the trend of states criminalizing the unauthorized disclosure 
of sexually explicit images of adults). For example, in 2014, Ryan Collins used phishing 
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to prevent or punish the third-party publication?particularly in the 
United States. The legal issue becomes balancing intrusion against free 
speech principles.86 Often, the republisher who copies and redistributes 
the hacked information may be protected by free speech principles. 
Relevant factors that may determine the outcome of legal challenges to 
republishers include: How was the information obtained? Did the 
republisher have a role in hacking or stealing the information, or were 
they an innocent third party? Is the disclosure of the content illegal, 
overly intrusive, or without justification? Was the subject of the 
publication newsworthy? Generally, content of the disclosure may not be 
considered, except in some limited constitutionally accepted restraints on 
speech relating to national security,87 obscenity, defamation, fraud, 
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.88 However, these 
cases are few and far between. Usually courts have allowed publication 
of dangerous, intrusive, and even illegally obtained information by third 
parties. 89
B. How Did the Intrusion Occur? 
The method of intrusion is also relevant to the legal analysis and legal 
liability. Data stolen despite an advanced security system differs 
significantly from data stolen because of a weak security system. In the 
wake of the Target hack, there were several reports regarding the 
company’s flawed security standards.90 Failure to meet technical or any 
                                                                                                                     
techniques to hack into the iCloud and Google accounts of several celebrities and then 
disseminated private, mostly nude images and videos of the celebrities. After several weeks of the 
media being shared privately, the photos and videos were posted on several online forums—
including 4chan and Reddit. In the span of one day, a subreddit titled “the Fappening” amassed 
over 100,000 subscribers. The willingness of both individuals and websites to non-consensually 
republish the intimate media prolonged the celebrities’ victimization and amount of harm 
suffered. See generally Adrienne Massanari, #GamerGate and The Fappening: How Reddit’s 
Algorithm, Governance, and Culture Support Toxic Technocultures, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 329 
(2015); Lancaster County Man Sentenced to 18 Months in Federal Prison for Hacking Apple and
Google E-Mail Accounts Belonging to More than 100 People, Including Many Celebrities, U.S.
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, MIDDLE DIST. OF PA., DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdpa/pr/lancaster-county-man-sentenced-18-months-federal-
prison-hacking-apple-and-google-e-mail.
86. See, e.g.,. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 
524 (1989). 
87. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
88. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010). 
89. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding the government 
could not use the national security exception to enjoin newspapers from publishing government 
documents). 
90. Jaikumar Vijayan, Target Breach Happened Because of a Basic Network Segmentation 
Error, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 6, 2014, 6:28 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/
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other reasonable security measures can spell liability. The class action 
lawsuit filed against Target specifically complained of rampant disregard 
of industry standard violations and negligence after the company ignored 
reports of the vulnerabilities of their point of sale system.91 Target’s 
negligent adherence to ineffective security protocols potentially exposed 
it to more liability than if the company had simply followed industry 
standards and heeded expert advice.92 The subsequent FTC v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp.93 decision reinforces the fact that negligence in 
maintaining cyber security incurs legal liability.94 In addition to 
penalizing Wyndham, that case confirmed the FTC’s right to hold 
companies to a standard of care for customer data.95
However, some intrusions are seemingly unavoidable. A company 
could abide by all security standards and still be hacked by a sophisticated 
group of cyber-criminals. This gap between cyber defense regulations 
and sophisticated attacks is largely due to the rapid development of 
technology. Abiding by regulations and standards created ten, five, or 
even two years ago does not necessarily prepare a company for the 
evolution of a modern cyber-criminal attack.96 Experts now advise 
companies to accept that that data breaches are virtually inevitable and 
focus on how to respond, as well as how to secure their most valuable 
data through encryption, controlling access, and authorization.97
This is especially true as these attacks become even more 
unpredictable. Cybercriminals have begun deploying ransomware attacks 
on soft targets, such as hospitals and law firms. After hacking into the 
system by exploiting software vulnerabilities, the criminals gain access 
                                                                                                                     
2487425/cybercrime-hacking/target-breach-happened-because-of-a-basic-network-segmentation
-error.html; see also Michael Riley et al., Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card 
Numbers: How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 17, 2014, 10:31 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-credit
-card-data.
91. Class Action Complaint at 12–13, Trustmark Nat. Bank v. Target Co., No. 
1:14CV02069, 2014 WL 1229602 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2014).
92. Joel Schectman, Banks Heap Suits on Target over Breach, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2014, 
3:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/07/banks-heap-suits-on-target-over-
data-breach/.
93. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
94. Id. at 246; see infra pp. 796–97.
95. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 246.
96. See Joe Dysart, ‘Ransomware’ Software Attacks Stymie Law Firms, A.B.A (June 1, 
2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ransomware_software_attacks_
stymie_law_firms; Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals Are the Perfect Targets for Ransomware, WIRED
(Mar. 30, 2016, 1:31 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/ransomware-why-hospitals-are-the-
perfect-targets/.
97. See GEMALTO & SAFENET, 2014 YEAR OF MEGA BREACHES & IDENTITY THEFT 11 
(2014), http://breachlevelindex.com/pdf/Breach-Level-Index-Annual-Report-2014.pdf.
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to PII and other confidential information and then threaten to expose the 
information if the ransom is not paid. For example, the 2017 WannaCry 
and Petya attacks used leaked NSA exploits to cripple networks across 
the globe. Notably, the Petya attack successfully targeted DLA Piper, an 
international law firm that touted its cybersecurity prowess.98 In addition 
to reputational harm, the attack left the firm without phone and internal 
document access for at least one day and without email access for nearly 
a week.99
As discussed, data breaches do not end with the intrusion, and often 
republication by third parties cause the most harm.100 Though the First 
Amendment protects most republishers, in Bartnicki v. Vopper101 the U.S.
Supreme Court set forth a three-part balancing test that weighs the 
conduct of the defendant, the public importance of the disclosure, and the 
nature of the disclosure.102 This balancing test determines the chance of 
success in limiting the dissemination and has become the essential rubric 
for determining the legality of such disclosures.103
Therefore, the Bartnicki analysis is important in examining 
publication of data breaches. In Bartnicki, the Court found that 
broadcasting a stolen audio recording was protected by the First 
Amendment because of the public importance of the recording, and 
because the defendant himself did not conduct the initial breach even 
though he knew it was obtained illegally.104 However, the Court indicated 
it would consider punishing disclosure if the disclosing party engaged in 
illegal activity to obtain the information.105
The logic of Bartnicki supports balancing privacy and publicly 
important information, sometimes with opposing outcomes. In 
Dahlstrom v. Sun Times Media, LLC,106 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit used the Bartnicki three-part test to determine that 
publication of illegally obtained information was wrongful.107 The court 
                                                                                                                     
98. See Sam Reisman, Days After Hack, DLA Piper Restores Email Service, LAW360 (June 
30, 2017 6:35 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/940448/days-after-hack-dla-piper-restores-
email-service.
99. Id. 
100. See supra Section I.C.
101. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
102. See id. at 525, 527, 534.
103. See Eric B. Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper as a Laboratory for First 
Amendment Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287, 330 (2011).
104. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529–30, 533–34. 
105. The Court, citing to New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), identifies the 
dissemination of child pornography as an example of a “rare occasion[] in which a law 
suppressing one party’s speech may be justified by an interest in deterring criminal conduct by 
another.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528–30.
106. 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 689 (2015).
107. Id. at 953.
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reasoned that publisher misconduct, combined with the determination 
that the information was not of great public interest, meant that disclosure 
was not protected by the First Amendment.108 The court also recognized 
that the statute in question, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 
limited disclosure of data based on the categorization and the source of 
the data.109 Importantly, because the statutory limitation was not based 
on content, the review of the statute’s constitutionality did not face strict 
scrutiny.110 The particular data in question were records of police officers 
that disclosed personal information from DPPA records.111 The issue is 
therefore a hybrid because the restriction is based on both the source 
(DPPA) and content (personal information), which the Sun-Times argued 
amounted to prior restraint.
The protective order issued by the lower court was also more 
justifiable because the same information about the officers derived from 
other sources was permitted to be published, thus reducing the public 
interest factor of the illegally obtained information.112 This evaluation is 
very fact-specific, as are many cases in the privacy-disclosure area.113
However, this case provides further logic supporting a restriction on 
disclosure of information that was legally obtained and personal in 
nature. This same logic may be used to support restrictions on disclosures 
or publications of sensitive information obtained from a breach. In other 
words, only a statute restricting disclosure of certain types of sensitive 
personal information obtained from an unlawful data breach could be 
constitutional.
Under the Bartnicki analysis, if a republisher has no knowledge that 
the data she seeks to publish was obtained illegally, the right of 
republication will almost always prevail.114 This means that bloggers who 
“innocently” posts stolen material may be protected under the Bartnicki
standard. Likewise, the Bartnicki standard would protect whistleblowers 
who reveal publicly valuable information such as government or 
corporate misconduct, while those who reveal private matters unrelated 
to public affairs are afforded little protection under the Whistleblower 
Protection Act. Announced in 2001, the Bartnicki standard predates many 
of the technical intrusions society now expects.115 However, the ability to 
balance the impact of intrusion against the nature of the disclosure is still 
                                                                                                                     
108. Id. at 954. 
109. See id. at 946–49. 
110. Id. at 949.
111. Id. at 941.
112. Id. at 953–54.
113. Id. at 954
114. See Easton, supra note 103, at 333.
115. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 514 (2001).
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relevant.116 The Bartnicki standard can provide a bridge to a remedy 
against harmful republication of leaked or hacked data, particularly in 
cases where the breach does not contain information of public concern, 
or where the data was obtained illegally.
III. THE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND STANDARDS FOR DATA SECURITY
Any entity in possession of personally-identifiable data has certain 
duties to protect that data. These standards of care are continually 
evolving based on rapid developments in technology and shifting legal 
and regulatory standards. If a data breach does occur, there are some 
firmly established obligations for companies to abide by, but there are
many unknown risks. The type of data and position of the data subject 
determine many of these regulations. One thing is certain—the breached 
entity must be ready to take immediate responsive action to the breach, 
or else be exposed to multiple dangers, including legal liability.117 This 
Section will explore various federal, state, and international data 
protection laws, as well as provide examples that show how companies 
have responded to modern data breaches. 
A. Federal Trade Commission—The Common Law of Privacy 
The principal federal watchdog on privacy issues is now the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC has a statutory duty to protect 
consumers, and this federal agency has interpreted this role to allow it to 
promulgate rules on data collection and protection as well as to punish 
violators of its standards.118 Accordingly, the FTC is now the source of 
                                                                                                                     
116. Consider the 2016 breaches involving the Democratic National Convention and the 
NSA. While the exact sources of these two breaches remains unknown, both breaches resulted 
from hacking and included the publication of highly intrusive information—including donor PII 
from the DNC breach and the NSA’s own hacking tools from the NSA breach. News agencies 
will have to continue to determine the best way to report on these kinds of breaches, which will 
have to include decisions regarding how much actual content from the breach to publish. See 
generally Dan Goodin, Group Claims to Hack NSA-Tied Hackers, Posts Exploits as Proof, ARS 
TECHNICA (Aug. 15, 2016, 8:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/08/group-claims-to-
hack-nsa-tied-hackers-posts-exploits-as-proof/ (describing the effects of an anonymous group’s 
hack without detailing the specific information the group made public); Dan Spinelli et al.,
Identity Thieves Target Dems’ Big Donors After DNC Hack, POLITICO (Aug. 18, 2016, 5:03 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/democratic-donors-identity-theft-cyberhack-227140
(detailing the extent of anonymous hacks of donor information without revealing what specific 
information was made public). 
117. Generally, all breached entities must be immediately prepared to respond to potential 
lawsuits from their consumers, financial institutions, insurers, shareholders, employees, and the 
government. See Melissa Maleske, The 6 Lawsuits All GCs Face After a Data Breach, LAW360
(Dec. 9, 2015. 2:17 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/735838/the-6-lawsuits-all-gcs-face-
after-a-data-breach.
118. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S
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most rules and standards for data collection and security.119 The FTC’s 
seemingly simple authority under Section V of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act to prevent “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce”120 has spawned an entire network of privacy and 
cybersecurity law as interpreted by the FTC.121 Despite a relatively small 
number of professional staff, the FTC has become the most prominent 
federal agency in privacy policy. The FTC has regulatory authority to
protect consumer privacy through the Fair Credit Reporting Act122 and 
the Gramm–Leach Bliley Act.123 Additionally, the FTC regulates data 
management practices of websites targeted towards children as set forth 
in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.124
The FTC drafts enforcement actions and publications that establish 
industry standards for privacy and security. A company that breaks these 
standards is immediately put within the crosshairs of Section 5,125 which
grants authority to the FTC to file an action against organizations that 
engage in “unfair or deceptive . . . practices.”126 The FTC investigates 
and cites hundreds of companies for violations of regulatory standards. 
In addition, the FTC will punish companies that fail to comply with their 
own privacy policies—even if their actions square with FTC standards.127
That sanction is imposed because misrepresentations of privacy or 
security policies is a violation of fairness standards even when the 
policies comply with technical standards. Data security violations can 
include: allowing data to be exposed by inadequate encryption or flawed 
security software, failure to test a security system, failure to implement 
                                                                                                                     
INVESTIGATIVE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 2 (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
120. Id. § 45(a)(1).
121. See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY ch. 6–11 (2016) (surveying the FTC’s authorities on specific issues such as online privacy, 
information security and international privacy efforts).
122. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(2012)).
123. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–
09); see FED. TRADE COMM’N, IN BRIEF: THE FINANCIAL PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS OF THE GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT 1, 4 (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-
language/bus53-brief-financial-privacy-requirements-gramm-leach-bliley-act.pdf.
124. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
06); see HOOFNAGLE, supra note 121, at 198–99.
125. ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719–20 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
127. See, e.g., Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges It Misrepresented 
Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug.
9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-
settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.
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security procedures, failure to assess procedures, failure to implement 
industry standards, failure to minimize data collection, failure to train 
employees, failure to monitor recipients, such as contractors or third 
parties, and inadequate password protocols.128
Dependent on the rapid development of technology, the manner in 
which companies collect and use data is unpredictable. Accordingly, in 
an effort to uphold their mission to protect consumers, the FTC has built 
their regulatory regime upon the principle of adaptability. FTC 
enforcement actions are not always spurred by actual breaches. The FTC 
can also find violations of their suggested practices (as provided in Start 
with Security: A Guide for Business), such as inadequate mode of 
collection, storage, usage of data, or failure to notify consumers about 
these inadequacies.129 These suggested practices are further reinforced 
through the FTC’s blog series, Stick with Security: Insights into FTC 
Investigations.130 The FTC may also punish a company that violates its
own terms of service under the deceptive practices theory, even if the data 
management practice would otherwise be considered adequate.131 Some 
industry representatives have commented that companies may be better 
situated by not making any representations about privacy other than those 
absolutely required.132
These punishments are initiated by FTC staff and are either a product 
of their own investigations or a result of consumer complaints. These 
actions usually end in settlements—213 occurred as of August 2017133—
although some violations have occasionally gone to trial.134 Settlements 
are usually in the form of a consent decree, and the company agrees to 
stop the disputed act. If a consent decree is violated, the FTC may fine 
the corporate data custodian up to $60,654 for each violation.135 The fine 
can reach exceedingly high amounts if a company violates a consent 
                                                                                                                     
128. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 3–8, 10, 12–
14 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwith
security.pdf.
129. Id.
130. Stick with Security: Insights into FTC Investigations, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (JULY 
21, 2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/07/stick-
security-insights-ftc-investigations.
131. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 128.
132. Id.
133. FED. TRADE COMM’N, LEGAL RESOURCES 1 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/legal-resources?title=&type=case&field_consumer_protection_topics_
tid=245&field_industry_tid=All&field_date_value%5Bmin%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_date_va
lue%5Bmax%5D%5Bdate%5D=August+24%2C+2017&sort_by=field_date_value.
134. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
135. FTC Publishes Inflation-Adjusted Civil Penalty Amounts, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-publishes-inflation-
adjusted-civil-penalty-amounts.
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decree or court order through the continued failure to protect consumer 
data. For example, the FTC levied a $100 million fine against LifeLock
Inc. after the FTC determined that the company violated a 2010 federal 
court order requiring the company to secure consumers’ personal 
information and prohibiting deceptive advertising.136
As a federal agency, the composition and focus of the FTC is often 
subject to political changes, including federal elections. Commissioners 
serve seven-year terms, and if there is a vacancy, the President of the 
United States nominates an individual to fill the position and the nominee
must then be confirmed by the United States Senate.137 While no more 
than three of the five Commissioners can be of the same political party, 
the President selects one Commissioner to act as Chairman.138
Predictably, the Chairman’s focus can significantly alter the FTC’s 
direction. For example, the appointment of Maureen Ohlhausen as 
Chairwoman by President Trump in January 2017 is expected to cause
the Commission to reprioritize the proof of tangible harm during FTC 
investigations, which ultimately may cause a reprioritization of corporate 
data security responsibilities.139
Despite this malleability, the effects of the FTC’s standards are far-
reaching. There is no private cause of action under Section 5 for 
consumers, but the FTC orders create data management standards that 
directly benefit consumers and affect standards for liability.140 Many
states have adopted unfair and deceptive trade practices laws modeled 
after Section 5, and common law negligence causes of actions have 
developed based off of these state statutes.141 By setting these standards, 
the FTC draws the line between effective data protection and violations 
of fair consumer practices. A breach that occurs because the company 
fails to comply with the FTC’s standards exposes a company to liability 
for consequences of the breach. Two recent orders against Wyndham 
Hotel Corporation and LabMD, Inc. illustrate and confirm the FTC’s 
regulatory reach for protecting consumer privacy. 
                                                                                                                     
136. See LifeLock to Pay $100 Million to Consumers to Settle FTC Charges It Violated 2010 
Order, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/12/lifelock-pay-100-million-consumers-settle-ftc-charges-it-violated.
137. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSIONERS, CHAIRWOMEN AND CHAIRMEN OF THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/
commissioners/ftc_commissioners_history_-_december_2016.pdf.
138. Id.
139. See Allison Grande, New FTC Chair to Shift Data Security Focus to Actual Harm, LAW 
360 (Jan. 26, 2017, 9:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/885212/new-ftc-chair-to-shift-
data-security-focus-to-actual-harm.
140. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
141. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2016).
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1. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in FTC v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp.142 reinforced the FTC’s central role in data security. 
After a data breach, the Wyndham Worldwide Corporation argued that 
the FTC did not have the statutory authority to penalize it for security 
failures and that it did not have constitutional notice of potential liability.
In other words, since the FTC had no explicit statutory authority to set 
security standards, Wyndham could not have fair notice of FTC 
standards. This challenge went to the core of the FTC’s authority to 
regulate privacy. Yet, the court rejected those arguments, concluding that
the FTC had authority to regulate data security practices under the 
unfairness prong of the FTC Act, the company’s practices did not fall 
outside the plain meaning of unfair, and that previous FTC adjudications 
and interpretive guidance provided the company with fair notice.143
In addition to misstating their own privacy policy in an unfair way, 
Wyndham’s substantial list of security transgressions included allowing 
payment card information to be available in readable text and failing to 
monitor for malware.144 The Third Circuit agreed with the FTC that 
Wyndham had engaged in cybersecurity practices that “taken together, 
unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data to 
unauthorized access and theft.”145 More notably, the court agreed that the 
FTC—as the focal point of cybersecurity policy to protect consumers—
has the authority to interpret statutes, including 15 U.S.C. 45(a).146 This 
opinion marked a major victory for FTC authority. Consequently,
corporations like Wyndham are put on notice of cybersecurity standards 
from FTC consent orders as well as other administrative guidance.147 In 
the wake of this decision, corporations must regularly assess their own 
security practices, track security rulings and law changes, and be aware 
that an FTC violation could subject the company to future negligence 
charges. For example, if a company does not encrypt sensitive 
information stored on its computer network,148 this failure could 
constitute a breach of an applicable security standard in a negligence 
action. In sum, then-FTC chairperson Edith Ramirez identified the 
Wyndham case as one of importance for the future of data security:
                                                                                                                     
142. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
143. Id. at 244–55.
144. Id. at 258.
145. Id. at 240.
146. Id. at 253–55, 259.
147. Id. at 257.
148. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 128, at 6.
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“[T]he court rulings in the case have affirmed the vital role the FTC plays 
in this important area.”149
2. LabMD, Inc. 
Another example of the FTC’s moves for privacy preeminence
involves a three-year investigation of the clinical laboratory, LabMD. In 
2012, the billing information for over 9,000 LabMD consumers was 
found on a peer-to-peer file sharing network, which led to the direct 
exposure of several hundred consumers’ records to identity thieves.150 On 
July 29, 2016, the FTC issued a Final Order that reversed an
administrative law judge’s dismissal of the FTC’s enforcement action 
with the main point of contention being whether an actual injury 
occurred.151 In the reversal, the FTC specifically reasoned that the federal 
commission did not have to abide by federal standing requirements, thus 
promulgating that a cognizable injury is not required for an FTC action.152
Further, the FTC justified their continued action against the now-defunct 
LabMD because the company technically still maintained consumer 
information and may use this information in the future.153 The issues of 
whether there is a tangible injury is a major threshold for federal 
jurisdiction. The issue is critical because negligent security practices may 
not result in actual injury. For example, the FTC may discover bad 
practices before there is a breach. If this decision survives appeal, then 
not only will consumer harm be redefined in injury requirements, but 
breached companies will be forced to deal with an FTC that can enforce 
its standards without needing to demonstrate harm.
B. Federal Communications Commission—Common 
Carrier Regulation 
As with the FTC, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has steadily expanded its regulatory reach. Although, the 2017 shift of 
leadership has already diverted this growth. The FCC regulates 
telecommunication companies, cable and satellite television providers,
                                                                                                                     
149. Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’ Payment Card 
Information at Risk, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:00 PM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-
unfairly-placed-consumers-payment.
150. LabMD, Inc., in the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter (last updated Sept. 29, 2016).
151. Final Order at 1, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357 (F.T.C. July 29, 2016).
152. Opinion of the Commission at 20 n.63, LabMD Inc., No. 9357 (F.T.C. July 29, 2016).
153. Id. at 36. 
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and, now, internet service providers (ISPs).154 The federal agency is 
empowered primarily by Sections 201(b),155 222,156 and 551157 of the 
Communications Act and utilizes the “just and reasonable” language in 
its authorizing legislation in similar way to how the FTC leverages its 
power with the “unfair and deceptive acts” language in Section 5. Similar 
to how health entities have a duty to secure protected health information
(PHI), telecommunication carriers have a specific duty to protect the 
unique form of data that they collect about their consumers. This data is 
called Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) and includes a 
wide range of information including the date of a call or the destination 
number of each call.158
In addition to providing guidance as how to best protect CPNI, the 
FCC has initiated actions against telecommunication companies to 
enforce data management standards. In October 2014, the FCC found two 
breached telecommunications companies—TerraCom Inc. and 
YourTel—in violation of § 201 and § 222 for the companies’ use of 
unsecure internet-based (cloud) storage of customer data.159 While 
initially planning to fine the companies $10 million,160 the ultimate fine 
totaled only $3.5 million.161 In another example, the FCC levied a civil 
penalty of $25 million for AT&T’s failure to take “every reasonable 
precaution” to protect customer data after two AT&T employees sold 
customer information to a third party and exposed the data of 51,422 
AT&T customers.162 Only a few months later, the FCC assessed a 
                                                                                                                     
154. See Report and Order on Remand at 3, 10, 14, 17, 22, 82–83, Protecting & Promoting 
the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28 (F.C.C. Mar. 12, 2015).
155. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (“All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for 
and in connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable.”). 
156. Id. § 222 (proscribing a duty on telecommunications carriers to “protect the 
confidentiality of proprietary information” of their customers and defining CPNI as “information 
that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of use 
of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier, 
and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer 
relationship” and “information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or 
telephone toll service received by a customer of a carrier”). 
157. Id. § 551 (defining notice requirement for cable operators and prohibiting cable 
operators from “us[ing] the cable system to collect personally identifiable information concerning 
any subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber concerned”). 
158. Id. § 222.
159. Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, FCC Plans $10 Million Fine for Carriers That 
Breached Consumer Privacy (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-plans-10m-fine-
carriers-breached-consumer-privacy.
160. Id.
161. Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, TerraCom and YourTel to Pay $3.5 Million to 
Resolve Consumer Privacy & Lifeline Investigations (July 9, 2015),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-334286A1.pdf.
162. Order ¶ 1, AT&T Servs., Inc., DA 15-399 (F.C.C. Apr. 8, 2015).
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$595,000 penalty on Cox Communications in the FCC’s first ever 
enforcement action on a cable company.163 An FCC investigation into a 
third-party hack of Cox’s system revealed that the company failed to 
adequately protect CPNI and PII.164 Although the FCC primarily focused
on Cox’s failure to protect customer information, the FCC also chastised 
the company’s violation of FCC notification standards.165 While AT&T 
and Cox simply failed to notify the FCC of the breaches within the 
mandated seven-day period, TerraCom and YourTel only notified the 
FCC after a news reporter discovered the breach.166
This reinvigorated level of enforcement became particularly 
important when the Ninth Circuit—in an opinion that the court has since 
ordered to be reheard—held that common carriers are exempt from FTC
Section V actions.167 As a result of this perceived gap, the FCC began
exploring new ways to exert their authority even beyond the enforcement 
actions discussed above. 
In 2015, the FCC and FTC signed a Memorandum of Understanding,
which clarified that the FTC can target and fine common carriers for any 
of their non-common carrier activities, such as any Fair Credit Reporting 
Act violations.168 In 2016, the FCC publicized their Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) that seeks to increase privacy protections for 
customers of broadband and other telecommunications services.169 Two 
of the most controversial components of the NPRM included (1) tighter 
restrictions for the protection of customer data170 and (2) extensive data 
breach notification requirements including mandated adoptions of risk 
management procedures and the obligation to notify affected customers 
no later than ten days after the breach.171 While the NPRM received 
extensive support from digital liberties organizations,172 State Attorneys 
                                                                                                                     
163. Order ¶ 4, Cox Commc’ns, Inc., DA 15-1241 (F.C.C. Nov. 5, 2015).
164. Id. ¶ 1.
165. Id. ¶ 2.
166. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 161.
167. See FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 15-16585, 2016 WL 4501685, at *4 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 29, 2016), reh'g en banc granted sub nom., Fed. Trade Commn. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 
864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).
168. FCC-FTC, FCC-FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 2
(2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/151116ftcfcc-
mou.pdf. 
169. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband &
Other Telecomm. Servs., WC Docket No. 16-106 (F.C.C Apr. 1, 2016).
170. Id. ¶¶ 60–66.
171. Id. ¶¶ 174, 234. 
172. Letter from Access Humboldt et al. to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.aclu.org/letter/coalition-letter-urging-fcc-reject-calls-weaken-broadband-privacy-
rule.
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General173 and the telecommunications industry174 staunchly opposed the 
NPRM as unnecessarily draconian. The negative reaction to the NPRM 
led then-FCC Chairman Thomas Wheeler to release an updated version 
of the proposed rule. The update included sensitivity distinction to 
comport with the existing FTC privacy framework, but very little change 
to the data breach requirements.175 While the FCC initially adopted the 
broadband privacy rules in October 2016,176 current FCC Chairman Ajit 
Pai successfully led the effort to stay the enforcement of the rules in 
March 2017.177 To formalize this stay, Congress voted to reverse the 
privacy rules and President Trump signed an official repeal of the rules 
in April 2017.178
Chairman Pai’s leadership signals the FCC’s likely reduced role in the 
establishment and enforcement of privacy and data security regulation.179
Despite this course reversal, it is in the best interest of any company that 
falls within the common carrier designation to follow both FCC and FTC 
guidelines, which includes staying up to date on any FCC consent decrees 
and FTC Section 5 enforcements.180
                                                                                                                     
173. Kurt Orzeck, FCC Should Drop ISP Privacy Plan, 16 State AGs Say, LAW360 (Sept. 
19, 2016, 9:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/840974/fcc-should-drop-isp-privacy-plan-
16-state-ags-say.
174. Allison Grande, Internet Group Fights Bid for Uniform FCC Privacy Rules, LAW360 
(Sept. 21, 2016, 9:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/843055/internet-group-
fights-bid-for-uniform-fcc-privacy-rules. 
175. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, FACT SHEET: CHAIRMAN WHEELER’S PROPOSAL TO GIVE 
BROADBAND CONSUMERS INCREASED CHOICE OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION 2 (2016),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db1006/DOC-341633A1.pdf.
176. FCC Adopts Broadband Consumer Privacy Rules, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Oct. 27, 
2016), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-broadband-consumer-privacy-rules.
177. FCC Moves to Ensure Consumers Have Uniform Online Privacy Protection, FED.
COMM. COMMISSION (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-moves-ensure-
consumers-have-uniform-online-privacy-protection.
178. Pub. L. No. 115-22; 131 Stat. 88 (2017). 
179. See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C., in Potential Sign of the Future, Halts New Data Security 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/technology/fcc-data-
security-rules.html?mcubz=0.
180. Companies should also stay up to date with any data security guidance released by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). In 2017, NIST issued a draft 
update to their 2014 Cybersecurity Framework that sets forth a highly detailed and technical 
approach for private organizations to better manage cybersecurity risk. NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY:
DRAFT VERSION 1.1 (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents////draft-
cybersecurity-framework-v1.1-with-markup1.pdf. In 2011, the SEC issued non-binding guidance 
for publicly traded companies that suffer a significant cybertheft or are vulnerable to such an 
attack. For example, the SEC encourages these companies to disclose a cybersecurity incident if 
it renders an investment in the company risky or if the incident materially affects its products, 
services, customer relationships, or competitive conditions. See DIV. OF CORP. FIN. SEC. & EXCH.
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C. Federal Standards in Other Sectors and Requirements for 
Notification 
In addition to the FTC’s broad jurisdiction and FCC regulation of 
communications, private and public-sector enterprises have additional 
specific regulatory requirements. Those requirements may be extremely 
industry specific—such as healthcare data protections set forth in 
HIPAA. However, there are also more general statutory requirements,
such as the breach notification standards that apply across industries, 
though even these notification standards may differ181 depending on the 
specific industry.182 These statutory duties are codified in several 
different statutes and federal rules rather than in one comprehensive law.
Irrespective of the particular federal legal obligation in a sector, any entity 
that suffers a breach would be well advised to promptly notify those 
exposed.
1.  Healthcare Data
Among the various possible private sector breaches, one of the most 
sensitive is disclosure of healthcare data. HIPAA sets forth the regulatory 
framework to protect health information. In the event of a data breach,
entities in the health sector183 are required to notify affected individuals
by first-class mail or email. The health care provider must also notify the 
media if the breach affects more than 500 individuals.184 Further, if a 
                                                                                                                     
COMM’N, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2, at 2, 4 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. In March 2016, the CFPB initiated their first 
data security enforcement action against a payment card company that deceived consumers about 
its data security practices. Citing the increased frequency of data breaches, the CFPB criticized 
the company’s failure to address known security flaws including poor employee practices. See 
Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against Dwolla for 
Misrepresenting Data Security Practices (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-dwolla-for-misrepresenting-data-security-practices/.
181. A 2010 Congressional Research Service Report provides a comprehensive discussion 
of the patchwork of federal data breach notification standards. See GINA STEVENS, CONG. RES.
SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 4
(2010).
182. In 2015, Congress considered several data breach bills that would create a more 
standardized data breach response across the sectors. The Center for Democracy and Technology 
analyzes four of the more prominent data breach bills in this 2015 report. See generally CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH., COMPARISON OF FOUR DATA BREACH BILLS CURRENTLY BEFORE CONGRESS 
(114TH SESSION) 1 (2015), https://cdt.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-09-Federal-DBN-Bills-
Comparison-Chart_2.pdf.
183. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 11-
5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
184. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414 (2017).
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“business associate” entrusted with patient information is breached, the 
associate must notify covered entities without unreasonable delay within 
sixty days of the breach.185 These protections are of a particular 
importance now as the healthcare industry has come under continual
assault from various hackers including the deployment of ransomware to
blackmail the provider.186
2. Education Data
Though education data has heightened privacy protections, the 
education sector does not have breach notification requirements, nor are 
they the subject of rigorous regulation by the FTC or FCC. In fact, the 
2008 amendment to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA) specifically detailed how:
The [U.S.] Department [of Education] does not have the 
authority under FERPA to require that agencies or 
institutions issue a direct notice to a parent or student upon 
an unauthorized disclosure of education records. FERPA 
requires only that the agency or institution record the 
disclosure so that a parent or student will become aware of 
the disclosure during an inspection of the student’s education 
record.187
The amendment advises that student notification may be triggered if 
the breach involves a social security number or other information that 
would increase the likelihood of identity theft.188 The Department of 
Education recommends that an institution should notify the Family Policy 
Compliance Office (FPCO) if a breach does occur.189 Regardless of 
notification, the FPCO has the authority to conduct its own investigation 
of the breach.190 If reintroduced in a future session, the proposed Student 
Privacy Protection Act would amend the current standards by requiring 
parental notification if a student’s data is accessed.191 As student data is 
increasingly stored using cloud computing,192 and education technology 
                                                                                                                     
185. Id. § 164.410(b).
186. See discussion infra pp. 788–89.
187. PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., DATA BREACH RESPONSE CHECKLIST 3 (2012),
http://ptac.ed.gov/sites/default/files/checklist_data_breach_response_092012.pdf. 
188. Id.
189. Id. at 9.
190. 34 C.F.R. § 99.64(b) (2017).
191. Student Privacy Protection Act, S. 1341, 114th Cong. (2015). 
192. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 75603, 75612 
(Dec. 2, 2011); see generally PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS–
CLOUD COMPUTING 1, 4 (2012), http://ptac.ed.gov/sites/default/files/cloud-computing.pdf.
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platforms become mainstream teaching tools,193 FERPA protection of
education data will need to be further updated to anticipate security 
challenges unique to sensitive digital data. 
3.  Financial Data
In the financial sector, Title V of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act 
(GLBA)194 requires financial institutions to notify individuals as soon as 
possible if the institution determines that misuse of PII has occurred or is 
reasonably possible. Due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the 
GLBA, the FTC will intervene to initiate compliance if an institution 
violates the data security or privacy standards.195 Beyond notification 
standards, the SEC has established a series of cybersecurity “requests” 
for corporate boards.196 SEC requests range from establishing a corporate 
culture of data security to having procedures in place in case of a data 
breach.197 In a similar vein, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
also released its 2015 Cybersecurity Report on Best Practices, which 
provides an extensive data security guide for broker-dealers.198
4.  Data Managed By Government and Government Contractors
In 2015, hackers compromised the data of 4 million federal employees 
in the massive Office of Personnel Management breach.199 In the event 
of a breach, the federal government must adhere to standards set by 
Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-07-16.200 For 
                                                                                                                     
193. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Department of Education Launches the 
Educational Quality Through Innovative Partnerships (EQUIP) Experiment to Provide Low-
Income Students with Access to New Models of Education and Training (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-department-education-launches-educational-
quality-through-innovative-partnerships-equip-experiment-provide-low-income-students-access-
new-models-education-and-training; see also FLA. STAT. § 1004.0961 (2016) (beginning in the 
2015–2016 school year, Florida students can earn academic credit for online courses). 
194. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1437 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6801–09 (2012)).
195. 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2017).
196. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
OCIE’S 2015 CYBERSECURITY EXAMINATION INITIATIVE 2 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/ocie/ 
announcement/ocie-2015-cybersecurity-examination-initiative.pdf. 
197. Id. 
198. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES 1 (2015),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%20Report%20on%20Cybersecurity%20Practi
ces_0.pdf.
199. Spencer Ackerman, US Government Responds to Latest Hack: Give Us More Power 
over Data Collection, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2015, 3:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jun/05/us-government-opm-hack-data-collection-powers.
200. Memorandum from Deputy Dir. for Mgmt. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget to the 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (May 22, 2007), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
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instance, a federal agency must internally disclose a breach of PII within 
one hour of becoming aware of the breach.201 However, external 
notification is not as immediate and must be done only without 
“unreasonable delay.”202
Another specific set of sector regulations apply to government 
contractors who handle Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and 
other federal information. Edward Snowden, for example, gained access 
to NSA data as an employee of Booz Allen Hamilton, a private sector 
contractor.203 In 2015, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) issued updated guidelines for federal agencies working with 
contractors who handle CUI.204 Because the guidelines do not impose 
strict requirements for the contractors to adopt, inconsistencies between 
different contractors are likely to develop. In May 2016, the Department 
of Defense, General Services Administration, and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration released a Final Rule to be added 
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation regarding the basic safeguarding of 
contractor information systems.205 The rule is applied with other federal 
requirements, but also maps out the basic cyber security practices to be 
adopted by all contractors that “process[], store[], or transmit[] [f]ederal 
contract information.”206 These practices include: authenticating or 
verifying the identities of users, processes, and devices before allowing 
access to an information system; sanitizing or destroying information 
system media containing federal personnel contract information before 
disposal, release, or reuse; and performing periodic malicious code scans 
of the information system and real-time scans of files from external 
sources as files are downloaded, opened, or executed.207
                                                                                                                     
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2007/m07-16.pdf.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Julian Borger, Booz Allen Hamilton: Edward Snowden’s US Contracting Firm,
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013, 5:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/booz-
allen-hamilton-edward-snowden.
204. These guidelines are not in and of themselves legally binding. However, failure to 
follow industry standards can be risky. See RON ROSS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
PROTECTING CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN NONFEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
AND ORGANIZATIONS 12 (2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST. 
SP.800-171.pdf.
205. Federal Acquisition Regulation for Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information 
Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,439, 30,439 (May 16, 2016) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 4, 7, 12, 
and 52).
206. Id. at 30,445.
207. Id. at 30,446.
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D. State Standards for Breach Notification 
In addition to the complex federal standards, forty-eight states have 
enacted data breach notification laws. California was the first state to 
enact a law requiring notification to victims of a data breach.208 The 
statute requires a data custodian to notify the original creator or “owner” 
of the data when data is disseminated to an unauthorized person.209 Most 
other states have since adopted similar statutes that require prompt 
notification when a data breach occurs and authorize civil penalties when 
notification is delayed or not made.210 However, if the data is encrypted, 
forty-seven states plus the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and 
Virgin Islands exempt the entities from these notification
requirements.211 Despite one in five breaches involving paper records,212
several states require notification if the data breach concerns electronic 
records only.213 Some states require notification immediately after a 
breach occurs, while others allow the data custodian to assess the 
potential risk of harm to the person before determining whether to issue 
notification.214 Data custodians face consequences for failing to notify or 
for making an untimely notification that vary from a small fine issued by 
a state agency to a private right of action for damages.215
The multitude of statutes across the states create a patchwork of 
standards and enforcement.216 Thirty-one states, plus Puerto Rico and the 
District of Columbia, have enacted legislation that broadens the general 
definition of personal information to reflect the changing technical 
landscape, including username and passwords, answers to security 
                                                                                                                     
208. See FCC-FTC, supra note 168, at 1.
209. GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42475, DATA SECURITY BREACH 
NOTIFICATION LAWS 3 (2012).
210. Id.
211. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, STATE DATA BREACH LAW SUMMARY 24–27 (2017),
https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Data_Bre
ach_Charts.pdf.
212. Melinda L. McLellan, 2015 BakerHostetler Incident Response Report Shows One in 
Five Breaches Involved Paper Records, BAKERHOSTETLER (June 1, 2015),
https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/data-breaches/2015-bakerhostetler-incident-response-
report-shows-one-in-five-breaches-involved-paper-records/.
213. See Many State Data Breach Laws Don’t Protect Paper Records, BLOOMBERG BNA:
TECH., TELECOM & INTERNET BLOG (Jan. 12, 2009), http://www.bna.com/state-data-breach-
b12884907245/.
214. STEVENS, supra note 209, at 6.
215. Steptoe & Johnson, LLP has created an excellent catalog of the different types of 
penalties different state notification laws authorize. STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, COMPARISON OF 
US STATE AND FEDERAL SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 3 (2016),
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/SteptoeDataBreachNotificationChart.pdf.
216. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 211, at 1.
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questions, or biometric data as PII.217 Alternatively, some states employ 
a catch-all definition as exemplified by New York’s statute: “Personal 
information means any information concerning a natural person which, 
because of name, number, personal mark, or other identifier, can be used 
to identify such natural person.”218
Most state statutes do not enable civil action if the personal data was 
acquired in encrypted form.219 However, a handful of state statutes 
provide that if encrypted data is obtained along with access to the 
encryption key, it renders the data as accessible as if it were unencrypted, 
and, accordingly, a civil action remedy is available.220
Many states give exclusive power to the attorney general to enforce 
data breach notice statutes,221 but some states provide exemptions to this 
standard, carving out the power for individuals to pursue civil remedies. 
Fourteen, plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands, permit a civil cause of action for data breaches, while Texas and 
Tennessee address data breach damages under their respective consumer 
protection acts.222 Even where a state provides an avenue for relief, 
demonstrating sufficient damages for a claim may be a challenge.223 Most 
states impose time limits and restrictions on monetary damages, such as 
the District of Columbia statute, which expressly states that damages may 
not include dignitary damages such as pain and suffering.224
Emerging state standards may soon become industry standards and 
targets for other federal and state governments alike.  For example, in the 
financial services industry, the New York Department of Financial 
Services (DFS) is setting a high bar with its highly detailed cybersecurity 
regime, which partially went into effect on March 1, 2017.225 This 
regulation requires covered entities to implement an internal
cybersecurity program and policy, requires third-party service providers 
to have a cybersecurity policy, hire a chief information security officer, 
                                                                                                                     
217. Id. at 2–9.
218. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(a) (McKinney 2016).
219. For example, Arkansas’s statute notes how the statute only applies to “unencrypted data 
elements.” BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 211, at 24.
220. See id. at 24–27.
221. State Attorneys General (AGs) are further expanding the role in data breaches by using
these notification laws to step in when the FTC fails to take action. For example, the New York 
AG entered into a settlement with Uber mandating the adoption of new authentication and 
encryption practices. Allison Grande, Uber Privacy Pact Shows New Enforcement Role for State 
AGs, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016, 10:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/745180/uber-privacy-
pact-shows-new-enforcement-role-for-state-ags.
222. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 211, at 22–23.
223. See generally Elizabeth D. de Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 1, 
7–8 (2008) (discussing federal gaps and the states’ role in protecting data privacy).
224. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 211, at 23.
225. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017).
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comply with access privileges and personnel/intelligence requirements, 
adopt an incident response plan, and bear the responsibility to provide 
notice of qualifying security to the DFS superintendent.226 The existence 
of state requirements and standards presents a challenge to every 
multistate enterprise. For example, the litigation surrounding the Target 
breach included allegations of violations of certain state standards where 
civil actions were authorized, as well as federal standards. Interstate 
enterprises are well advised to be aware of state security and notification 
standards.
IV. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION OR RESPONSES TO A DATA BREACH
Providing legal remedies for victims of breach presents novel 
challenges. Government actions are limited to penalizing companies or 
punishing hackers. Government sanctions against companies can be 
significant and harmful to these private entities, but harmed individuals 
have had limited success because of outdated or inadequate remedies. 
Based on the continued frequency of data breaches, government actions 
alone are neither an effective deterrent to hackers, nor an adequate 
remedy for harmed individuals. 
For any given data breach, there may be multiple plaintiffs and also 
numerous defendants. The breached entity may seek recovery from others 
who are responsible for the data breach. For example, the harmed 
company may seek relief against the hacker, an individual causing the 
breach, a data custodian, a service provider, or a subcontractor. Other 
injured parties—other than the exposed individual—may seek recovery 
against the breached company. Common examples are banks or credit 
card companies who are legally accountable to customers whose credit 
card data was stolen and used.227 Most often, the individual must join a 
class action option, which reflects the relatively small nature of the losses,
but also presents multiple approaches to seeking compensation. Even 
though the common law remedies have yet to be highly effective, there 
are, hypothetically, a plethora of options available. 
A. Negligence 
A plaintiff in a data breach class action premised on negligence will 
allege that the company, as the data custodian, had a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in protecting the plaintiff’s PII, the company breached 
                                                                                                                     
226. Id.
227. Banks and credit card companies will compensate customers for fraudulent charges, but 
seek reimbursement—with varying degrees of success—from retail companies for expenses 
incurred through a data breach. Julie Creswell, As Online Data Theft Escalates, Banks Look to 
Retailers to Bear the Losses, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
09/29/business/as-online-data-theft-escalates-banks-look-to-retailers-to-bear-the-losses.html.
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that same duty, and that this breach caused the resulting damages, for 
example, allowing or inducing the data breach.228 Typical claims brought 
against a data custodian premised on negligence may be negligent or 
unreasonable data security practices, failing to fix compromised security 
systems, failing to test a network security system, or breaching a general 
duty to keep consumer’s data safe.229 In these negligence actions, the 
standard of care is a central issue during litigation.230
These actions may allege that the data custodian “enables cybercrime, 
unreasonable data security practices, or fail[s] to fix known security 
vulnerabilities that compromise confidential information.”231 Another 
approach to establish liability is grounded in statutory standards for data 
custodians, “such as vendor liability under Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) or the application of professional malpractice 
law to software programmers.”232 Still other plaintiffs have pled liability 
on grounds of a breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that the plaintiff relied 
on the company holding the data, which was in a position of trust and 
confidence to use the data to the plaintiff’s benefit.233
Regardless of the particular negligence theory a data breach victim 
utilizes in a suit against the data custodian, the greatest hurdle data breach 
victims face when suing in negligence is the economic loss rule.234 This 
time-honored legal doctrine precludes recovery in tort for economic 
losses where the economic loss does not stem from a causally related 
personal injury or tangible property damage.235 However outdated, courts 
                                                                                                                     
228. See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010).
229. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
966 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining that plaintiffs in a data breach class action alleged that Sony 
violated a duty to consumers to provide reasonable network security and “allege[d] [that] this duty 
included, among other things, the duty to design, implement, maintain, and test Sony’s security 
system in order to ensure Plaintiff’s Personal Information was adequately secured and protected”);
William Dalsen, Comment, Civil Remedies for Invasions of Privacy: A Perspective on Software 
Vendors and Intrusion upon Seclusion, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (2009).
230. See In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
231. Dalsen, supra note 229, at 1063.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Daly v. Metro. Life Ins., 782 N.Y.S.2d 530, 535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
234. In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to redefine the economic loss rule to allow 
recovery under a federal cause of action despite the nonexistence of concrete harm. Spokeo Inc. 
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in 
the context of a statutory violation.”)
235. For a thorough discussion on the different common law and state-specific statutory 
exceptions to the economic loss doctrine in a consumer data breach class action, see In re Sony,
996 F. Supp. 2d at 966–73; cf. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Extending Learned 
Hand’s Negligence Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 I/S 237, 268 n.139 (2007)
(noting that plaintiffs have not been successful in “side-stepping” the economic loss rule in data 
breach cases premised on negligence).
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are reluctant to recognize data as legal property.236 Further, if the victim 
suffers no financial harm—for example, when a credit card loss is 
covered by the card company—there is no “economic loss.” As a result, 
data breach victims suing under negligence are frequently unsuccessful
in surviving motions to dismiss.237
The economic loss rule does not always operate as a total bar to 
negligence claims. Compensatory damages have been successfully 
sought against corporate data custodians under theories that held the 
custodians to a standard to exercise reasonable care of the data regardless 
of direct economic loss.238 In some states, noneconomic damages have 
been permitted in a data breach negligence cause of action. For example, 
in the recent Target data breach class action, negligence claims survived 
Target’s initial motion to dismiss under Georgia, D.C., Idaho, and New 
Hampshire law.239 However, in 2016, the Third Circuit ruled that the 
economic loss doctrine barred a plaintiff from claiming negligence after 
a data breach.240
Plaintiffs also face justiciability issues such as standing and ripeness 
when suing in negligence or any other common law action. Many data 
breach victims can only allege the mere threat of identity theft or other 
speculative damages rather than particularized damages, such as a dollar 
amount lost by someone utilizing their personal profile. In other words, 
it is difficult to assign value to the harm caused in a data breach where 
the victim has suffered no particular loss. In light of the recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,241
which reemphasized the need for a threatened injury to be “certainly 
impending” to meet standing requirements,242 more recent cases have 
followed the traditional stringent approach to standing.243 For example, 
in 2015, a New Jersey federal court denied standing to plaintiffs who had 
                                                                                                                     
236. See Douglas H. Meal & David T. Cohen, Private Data Security Breach Litigation in 
the United States, ASPATORE, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:a4I5Jit 
356YJ:https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/articles/2014/February/Meal%2520Chapter.as
hx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
237. Id.
238. See In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 966–73.
239. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1314 (D. 
Minn. 2014). However, the development of the economic loss rule in Alaska, California, Illinois, 
Iowa, and Massachusetts required the court’s dismissal of certain negligence claims brought by 
plaintiffs from these states. Id.
240. Longenecker-Wells v. Benecard Servs. Inc., No. 15-3538, 2016 WL 4474701, at *1–2
(3d Cir. Aug. 25, 2016).
241. 113 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
242. Id. at 1147.
243. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655–56 (S.D. Ohio
2014), rev’d and remanded, Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 
2016). 
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their PII and PHI stolen as part of a breach that affected 800,000 patients, 
and also denied standing to the one plaintiff in the consolidated class 
action that actually suffered from identity theft after the breach.244
Nevertheless, some courts have found that the credible threat of harm 
resulting from a data breach is enough to satisfy standing requirements.245
The issue of individual remedy or recovery as a victim of a data breach 
with no defined loss remains uncertain territory.
B. Fair Credit Report Act Claims 
To invoke subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts, data breach 
plaintiffs have also attempted to bring a Federal Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA)246 claim against a hacked company. A FCRA claim targets the 
company’s improper transfer of data to unauthorized third parties.
Pursuing this statutory violation is an effort to overcome the barrier of the
economic loss rule discussed primarily. A May 2016 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision not only provided an example of this strategy, but also 
reenergized plaintiffs involved in class action lawsuits that traditionally 
struggle to establish actual harm.
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,247 Robins argued that Spokeo, a people 
search website, violated FCRA by publishing inaccurate information 
about him online.248 Robins’s argument focused on how the inaccurate 
information negatively affected his search for a job.249 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Robins that the statutory 
violation, as alleged, constituted actual harm sufficient to establish 
standing.250 The U.S. Supreme Court did not completely agree. In a 6–2
decision, Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, explained that 
the allegation of an injury-of-fact requires the injury to be concrete and 
                                                                                                                     
244. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 13-7418 (CCC), 2015 WL 
1472483, at *4–9 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015) (dismissing the consolidated class action of plaintiffs 
whose PII and PHI were stolen after two employees’ encrypted laptops were stolen). 
245. See Meal & Cohen, supra note 236 (citing, inter alia, Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding plaintiffs had standing because they alleged a credible 
threat of real and immediate harm of stolen personal information after a laptop was stolen); Ruiz 
v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding standing because risk of identity theft 
from stolen laptop was “real, and not merely speculative”); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 
F.3d 629, 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding standing because “the injury-in-fact requirement can 
be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing 
the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s
actions,” but dismissing because the cost of credit monitoring is not a compensable damage).
246. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 
(2012)).
247. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
248. Id. at 1546.
249. Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 1544–45 (majority opinion).
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/3
2017] PRIVACY, MASS INTRUSION, AND THE MODERN DATA BREACH 811
particularized.251 Because the Ninth Circuit failed to fully analyze both 
of these requirements, the case would need to be reheard by the Ninth 
Circuit.252 Fortunately for Robins and other data breach plaintiffs, the 
Court’s ruling is not a complete bar to FCRA or other statutory claims. 
The Court also recognized that the risk of harm could constitute an injury-
of-fact. Justice Alito wrote: 
Just as the common law permitted suit in such instances, the 
violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be 
sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. 
In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any 
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.253
Unfortunately, this decision also does not completely clarify this 
murky issue. Without a clear path, plaintiffs continue to pursue creative 
litigation strategies based on the hope afforded by the Supreme Court.254
After rehearing the Spokeo case, the Ninth Circuit provided plaintiff and 
defense counsel alike with little certainty in regard to when the violation 
of a federal statute gives rise to a concrete injury.255 While a unanimous 
Ninth Circuit panel ruled that Robins had Article III standing because the 
statutory violation implicated his “concrete interests in truthful credit 
reporting,” the court also recognized that “determining whether any given 
inaccuracy in a credit report would help or harm an individual (or perhaps 
both) is not always easily done.”256 Thus, courts still have significant 
discretion when analyzing whether a FCRA or other statutory violation 
gives rise to Article III standing, and plaintiffs will continue to have to 
test these limits.   
C. Privacy Torts 
Affected individuals may also turn to privacy torts to redress their 
injuries. There are four different traditional privacy torts: (1) intrusion 
upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) appropriation of 
name or likeness; and (4) publicity placing a person in false light.257
                                                                                                                     
251. Id. at 1547–50. 
252. Id. at 1550. 
253. Id. at 1549.
254. Compare Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027, at 
*3–6 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016) (holding that the plaintiffs could continue their class action suits 
based on negligence, bailment, and FCRA violations without establishing that their customer data 
had been misused), with Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the plaintiff’s Cable Communications Policy Act claim could not meet the Spokeo
bar because the retention of consumer data did not cause the plaintiff any definite harm). 
255. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017).  
256. Id. at 1116–17.
257. JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE 42–44 (2015).
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Though the damages flowing from a data breach may concern all of these 
violations of privacy, the first two traditional torts are most applicable. 
Intrusion upon seclusion protects an individual’s “spatial” privacy, 
which can be violated without disclosure or publication of the 
individual’s data because the commission of the tort is the intrusion 
itself.258 The intrusion does not have to be physical259 and may be a 
breach of a persons’ “digital space.”260 In order to prevail under the 
intrusion upon seclusion tort, the data breach victim must satisfy the tort’s 
three elements: (1) the intrusion was intentional; (2) the act intruded upon 
matters that the data breach victim reasonably expected would remain 
private; and (3) the intrusive act was highly offensive to the reasonable 
person.261 Unlike a negligence cause of action, proof of damages is not 
an element of the intrusion upon seclusion tort. The economic loss rule 
also does not apply, so data breach victims may bring the action even 
when the damage is not purely economic. However, traditional 
justiciability requirements still apply to limit suits based on speculative 
injuries. 
The third element of this privacy tort—whether the intrusive act was 
highly offensive to the reasonable person—is a shifting target and 
difficult to standardize. An intrusion that resulted in the dissemination of 
a person’s health information protected by federal regulations such as 
HIPAA would likely offend a reasonable person. As would an intrusion 
that resulted in the dissemination of any sort of data protected by the 
patchwork of regulations previously discussed,262 such as the unlawful 
disclosure of an individual’s credit card information. However, 
dissemination of an aggregated set of individual data points that are 
readily available to the public—such as an address, telephone number, 
age, and name—may not be so objectively offensive in light of the fact 
that the information collected was public. The intentionality element of 
this privacy tort also presents a problem for the average data breach 
victim seeking to sue the data custodian rather than the hacker, simply 
because most data custodians never intend for a data breach to occur. 
Hackers would meet the intentionality standard, but are more difficult to 
sue because they are frequently anonymous and may not have any assets 
to collect with a judgment.263
                                                                                                                     
258. Id. at 42.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 43.
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
262. See supra Part III.
263. Terry Bollea, who publicly is known by his wrestler-moniker Hulk Hogan, initiated a 
high-profile legal action—including invasion of privacy, publication of private facts, violation of 
the right of publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—against Gawker after the 
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The tort of public disclosure of private facts requires the actual 
publication of facts that are so sensitive and personal that a reasonable 
person would object to their publication.264 This action may only be
brought by a natural person, not a corporation.265 Unlike an intrusion 
upon seclusion claim, this tort does not require proof that the 
dissemination of the public facts was intentional.266 Again, the data 
custodian who loses data due to a computer hacking did not actually 
“publish” the information. Usually if the information was published, the 
hacker or someone to whom the hacker disclosed the information 
published it. 
For example, in Randolph v. ING Life Insurance & Annuity Co.,267 the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that an insurance 
company did not “publish” personal information stolen from the 
company when a thief stole one of the insurance company’s computers 
containing a trove of personal information.268 Similarly, in Galaria v. 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,269 a federal district court judge in 
Ohio held that the publicity requirement was not met when a data breach 
resulted in the theft of personal information by a hacker.270 The class of 
plaintiffs in Galaria had given personally identifiable information to 
Nationwide Insurance in the course of purchasing insurance products and 
other services from Nationwide, but later found out that the information 
had been stolen when Nationwide’s computer network was hacked.271
Like most data breach scenarios, the hackers were never found, and the 
only plausible defendant for seeking a remedy for the invasion of privacy 
caused by the data breach was the data custodian, Nationwide Insurance,
and it could not be held liable.
                                                                                                                     
website posted excerpts of a sex tape featuring the former wrestler accompanied with a written 
report that detailed and commented on the sex tape. Bollea claimed he did not release the tape and 
Gawker maintained that they received the tape anonymously. Without the original leaker/intruder 
to go after, Bollea targeted, and eventually took down, the popular website. Gawker Media, LLC 
v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also Sydney Ember, Gawker and 
Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement.html.
264. MILLS, supra note 257, at 43.
265. Id. at 46.
266. Id. at 43.
267. 973 A.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
268. Id. at 710.
269. 998 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d and remanded, Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 
WL 4728027, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016).
270. Id. at 663.
271. Id. at 650.
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D. Unjust Enrichment 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable theory of law rooted in contract law 
principles.272 The essential element of unjust enrichment is that the 
plaintiff actually conferred an unjust benefit on the defendant.273 A data 
breach defendant that came into possession of the plaintiff’s data without 
having received any remuneration from the plaintiff—in the form of the 
plaintiff purchasing something from the defendant, for example—will 
likely be immune from an unjust enrichment claim bought by the data 
breach victim. Data breach victims who have brought successful unjust 
enrichment causes of action against data custodians had each bought a 
product or service from the data custodian.274 Thus, if the victim 
purchased a product, such as a video game or some clothes, liability may 
be possible. 
Unjust enrichment may also be asserted by corporate employees 
against a corporate data custodian that opportunistically failed to protect 
employee data. In Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co.,275 former employee Shane 
Enslin brought a class action against Coca-Cola following the theft of 
several company laptops that contained PII and the subsequent identity
theft that Enslin endured.276 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania dismissed most of Enslin’s claims, but  allowed 
his unjust enrichment claim to move forward.277 The court agreed that 
Enslin had fairly alleged the existence of an express or implied agreement
that the company would protect the employee’s PII as a result of the 
employee’s acceptance of the employment contract.278 Essentially, the 
company failed to implement adequate security measures to protect from 
the theft and benefited from employee labor while doing so.
E. Violation of Trade Secrets 
During the recent rash of data breaches, an avalanche of commercial 
information were divulged, including private communications, strategies, 
                                                                                                                     
272. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3:12–cv–00325–RCJ–VPC, 2013 WL 4830497, at *4
(D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013).
273. Id.
274. See In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1178 (D. Minn. 
2014) (accepting the plausibility of plaintiff’s “would not have shopped” theory which alleged 
that Target should have not received plaintiffs’ money when plaintiffs would not have spent 
money at Target if they had known about the breach); see also Meal & Cohen, supra note 236
(citing Bell v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. 12-CV-09475 BRO (PJWx), slip op. at 7–8 (C.D. Cal. 
July 11, 2013) (where video game consumers alleged violations of the video game developer’s 
privacy policy)).
275. 136 F. Supp. 3d 654 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
276. Id. at 658–60.
277. Id. at 669–80.
278. Id. at 674–75. 
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customer lists, movie scripts, marketing ideas, and other commercial 
secrets. Some of the disclosures were protectable intellectual property 
and others were just embarrassing private files. Determining whether the 
commercial information qualifies as protectable intellectual property 
turns on the distinct characteristics outlined by the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act (UTSA). The criteria are: (1) the information is subject to reasonable 
measures to maintain its secrecy and (2) by remaining secret, the 
information confers a competitive advantage on its owner.279 Examples 
of information protected under trade secret are the formula for Coca-
Cola, proprietary customer lists, and copyrighted material such as an 
unreleased motion picture or script. While some items are clearly 
protectable intellectual property, the vulnerability for breach and the 
ability to share stolen information widely almost instantly creates a 
difficult setting to enforce trade secret laws.
In some instances, the existing law will protect against the 
redistribution of trade secrets. Under UTSA, anyone who steals valid 
trade secret property can be liable for the loss and resulting damages, and 
trade secret owners can seek injunctions to prevent disclosure.280 In the 
right circumstances, even a republication of a trade secret exposed by a 
data breach may be a violation of UTSA. This protection from further 
republication would likely depend on the content of the trade secret and 
the extent of the republication.281
Despite the fact that the Bartnicki court specifically rejected a blanket 
First Amendment protection for the republication of trade secrets,282 an 
innocent third party may be protected and allowed to publish a stolen 
trade secret if it deals with a matter of public concern. For example, in 
CBS Inc. v. Davis283 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the view that 
disclosure of a trade secret was protected speech if it was related to public 
health and safety.284 The Court overturned a preliminary injunction that 
would have prevented CBS from broadcasting undercover footage of a 
meat packing facility, which included trade secrets, despite CBS’s
                                                                                                                     
279. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)–(ii) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 1985).
280. Id. § 2(a).
281. In Bartnicki, the Court identified limits to First Amendment protection of republished 
material, particularly information of public importance. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 
(2001). The Court suggested that republishing trade secrets may not qualify as protected speech, 
as they would fail the prong of Bartnicki requiring the information to be of public importance: 
“We need not decide whether that interest is strong enough to justify the application of § 2511(c) 
to disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern.” 
Id.
282. Id.
283. 510 U.S. 1315 (1994).
284. Id. at 1318.
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“calculated misdeeds” in obtaining the footage.285 This result should be 
no surprise. Under the Bartnicki balancing test,286 even stolen 
information is provided with First Amendment republication protection 
if the information has significant public importance. It is unclear what the 
outcome would be if the stolen information was insignificant but just as 
intrusive. In that case, trade secret protection might apply.
When trade secrets are treated more as property than information, the 
plaintiff’s chances to stop republication improve because the breach and 
publication are considered a theft or misappropriation of an identifiable 
asset rather than pure speech.287 Simply put, property rights do not face 
the same test for publication as information under the First Amendment. 
The California Supreme Court tacitly accepted this argument in DVD 
Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner288 and ultimately held that an injunction 
prohibiting the online publication of a trade secret (a code for breaking 
DVD encryption technology) did not constitute an unlawful prior 
restraint.289 However, as discussed, the argument to prohibit online 
publication is considerably weakened if the trade secret owner is seeking 
post-disclosure injunctive relief. Accordingly, although a trade secret 
posted on an obscure website may be protected from publication under 
UTSA, a loss of trade secret status will likely occur if it is widely 
distributed online. Likely due to these considerations, the California 
Court of Appeal for the Sixth District reversed the granting of the 
preliminary injunction in Bunner because the technology had since lost 
its trade secret status after continued online publication on several 
different popular websites.290
Policymakers should work to redefine misuse of trade secrets to 
include republication, and to reclassify stolen sensitive information as 
property or protectable information, unless there is a public interest for 
disclosure. Until policies change or court interpretations evolve, the 
epidemic of data breaches will continue to facilitate substantial harm to 
corporations as well as mass privacy intrusions on individuals.
                                                                                                                     
285. Id. at 1315–18.
286. See discussion supra pp. 789–91.
287. See Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and 
the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 799–805 (2006).
288. 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003). 
289. Id. at 17–19. Once again demonstrating that matters of public concern will receive First 
Amendment publication protection, the court also distinguishes between the code at issue in the 
case and trade secrets involving matters of public concern. Id. at 15–16. The latter, a matter of 
public concern, implicates First Amendment protection and will prevent an injunction against an 
online post. Id.
290. DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 195–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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F. Other Common Law Actions 
Replevin is an action at law designed to recover a specific piece of 
personal property.291 A replevin action does not seek damages for the loss 
of the property, but rather the physical recovery of the property.292 If this 
has applicability in a data breach scenario, a replevin action would seek 
the return of the data to the data breach victim. A replevin action may 
have some applicability to litigation seeking to stop dissemination of the 
stolen data by the media or others. However, due to the amorphous nature 
of “data,” and the courts’ reluctance to define data as any type of property, 
much less personal property,293 replevin is generally not a useful action 
for the data breach victim, regardless of whether the victim is an 
individual or a corporation. Further, because stolen data is usually widely 
republished by third parties, replevin of the original data may provide 
little actual relief to the victim. A trespass to chattels remedy is similar to 
replevin, except damages are sought rather than the repossession of the 
stolen property.
Bailment is “the relationship that arises when personal property is
delivered to another for some particular purpose with an express or 
implied contract to redeliver the property when the purpose has been 
fulfilled, or to otherwise deal with the property according to the bailor’s 
instructions.”294 The classic example of a bailment claim is one made 
against a valet driver who refuses to deliver a patron’s car.295 Data breach 
plaintiffs have attempted to apply this old common law claim to modern, 
technologically complex data breach litigation scenarios.296 Yet the 
transitory and quickly replicating nature of digital data may make it
impossible to “return” it to the data breach plaintiff after a disclosure or 
further republication.297 Further, as discussed, most courts have not 
recognized “data” as legal property.298
G. Cyber Liability Insurance 
Due to the inadequate patchwork of legal remedies to fix the emerging 
web of problems surrounding data breach, some corporations use cyber
liability insurance as an option to minimize seemingly inevitable 
                                                                                                                     
291. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Replevin § 1, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016).
292. See id.
293. Meal & Cohen, supra note 236, at 7.
294. Id. (citing Earhart v. Callan, 221 F.2d 160, 163 (9th Cir. 1955)).
295. Id.
296. Id. 
297. Id.
298. Id.
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damages.299 Although such protections were traditionally used only in 
high-risk industries such as healthcare and finance, many companies in a 
wide range of industries are now purchasing cyber liability policies as 
part of their standard operating practices.300 However, as with any 
insurance scheme, coverage can be denied, and data breach insurance is 
a complex area. Cyber liability insurance provides coverage for losses
and crisis management support after a breach.301 However, cyber liability 
insurance is not a standalone tactic for data security, but rather one tool 
in a company’s cyber security toolbox.302 Before attaining coverage, 
companies are often expected to have adequate risk management 
techniques already in place. If the company maintaining the data has been 
negligent, it is likely that insurance coverage will be denied after the 
breach, or be subject to higher premiums. However, if a company forgoes 
data breach insurance, it may not be able to simply rely on its preexisting 
commercial general liability policy.303 This predicament results in 
increased costs and uncertain data security standards for the consumers.
Because the internet is global, the challenges for redressing data 
breaches are worldwide. A data breach on a company with a multinational 
reach will give rise to legal issues that cross borders.304 The European 
Union and the United States are partners in many agreements and also are 
home to numerous corporations who do business in both jurisdictions. It 
is important to understand that these two jurisdictions, although they have 
much in common, have important differences in regulating privacy and 
data breaches. 
                                                                                                                     
299. In fact, there is a developing industry in cybersecurity insurance. See Mahendra 
Ramsinghani, Can Startups Disrupt the $20 Billion Cyber Insurance Market?, TECH CRUNCH
(May 23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/23/can-startups-disrupt-the-20-billion-cyber-
insurance-market/.
300. Steve Durbin, Cybercrime: The Next Entrepreneurial Growth Business?, WIRED,
https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/10/cybercrime-growth-business/ (last visited Nov. 21, 
2017).
301. JUDY SELBY & C. ZACHARY ROSENBERG, THOMSON REUTERS, CYBERINSURANCE:
INSURING FOR DATA BREACH RISK 1 (2014), https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/News/
Articles/LITIGATION/2014/Selby-Rosenberg-Dec-2014.pdf.
302. See Durbin, supra note 300.
303. See Zurich Am. Ins. v. Sony Corp., No. 651982/2011, 2014 WL 3253541, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014) (holding that Sony’s insurance companies did not owe Sony coverage 
under their general liability policy after the 2014 PlayStation hacks); see also Young Ha, N.Y. 
Court: Zurich Not Obligated to Defend Sony Units in Data Breach Litigation, INS. J. (Mar. 17,
2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2014/03/17/323551.htm (noting that Sony’s 
commercial general liability policy did not provide coverage for data breach incident). 
304. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., PRIVACY REVISITED: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE (2016).
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V. COMPARING EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES POLICIES FOR 
DATA BREACHES AND PRIVACY 
Because the transfer of digital information takes place on a global 
scale, it is important to consider distinctions in international and cross-
border privacy law. As distinguished from the United States’ treatment 
of privacy as a penumbral right, the European Union treats a person’s
right to privacy as fundamental. The right to privacy is explicitly 
enshrined in the European Union’s premier human rights treaty, the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).305 In the European 
Union, the right to privacy is afforded the same level of legal protection 
as the freedom of expression.306 Accordingly, European courts must 
balance the right to privacy with the freedom of expression rather than 
substantially favoring the freedom of expression like courts in the United 
States.307 The impact of this balance is noticeable in both European case 
law, which sets forth the “right to be forgotten,” and legislative reform,
including the incoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and 
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.
A. Privacy Law Within the European Union
Arising from a more equal balancing between privacy and speech,
Europeans treat the issue of prior restraint differently from the United 
States. Although European courts are hesitant to enjoin speech,308 the line 
appears to be drawn with a less liberal interpretation than in the United 
States. In the case of Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland,309 the 
Court upheld Swiss authorities’ decision to ban a Raelian poster from 
display along public highways, weighing the harm of the controversial 
material over the speakers’ religious freedom.310 Previous cases in 
Europe have banned similar content, such as Nazi paraphernalia, under 
circumstances that would not justify banning the same content in the 
United States.311
                                                                                                                     
305. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 
4, 1950, 1955 U.N.T.S. 222.
306. Id. art. 10.
307. See MILLS, supra note 257, at 66–68.
308. See Yildirim v. Turkey, 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 505, 542–43 (holding that the Turkish 
government could not block access to an academic website where plaintiff expressed controversial 
political views).
309. 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, 441–43, 447.
310. Since the Raelian movement stood in favor of principles like “human cloning, 
geniocracy, and sensual meditation” (often predicated on viewing the child as a privileged sexual 
object), the court held that there were sufficient public interest grounds to justify the government’s 
refusal to allow the poster to be displayed along the highway. Id.
311. French web users were accessing online auction websites in the United States to 
purchase Nazi memorabilia. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 
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While the European Union may enforce some privacy components 
more strictly than the United States, the test to determine the legality of 
disclosure is strikingly similar to the test developed in Bartnicki. In Axel 
Springer AG v. Germany,312 the European Court of Human Rights 
provided an analysis for determining whether a ban on the publication of 
an arrest and conviction of a well-known actor violated Article 10 of the 
ECHR. That Court evaluated (1) whether the event published was of 
general interest; (2) whether the person concerned was a public figure;
and (3) how the information was obtained and whether it was reliable.313
Similar to the Bartnicki holding, the Court found in favor of publication 
because the actor was well known and the information was only 
published after the prosecuting authorities’ disclosure.314 Again, freedom 
of expression triumphed over the right to privacy.
In a 2014 ruling, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
ruled that the fundamental right to personal privacy overrides, as a rule, 
not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but 
also the interest of the general public in accessing information online.315
Upholding the right to be forgotten, the Court ruled that Google must 
comply with EU data protection rules and remove a link for a digitized 
article that accurately detailed the foreclosure of the plaintiff’s home.316
Since 2014, Google has accepted more than 1 million URL removal 
requests (56.8% of all requests are approved).317 The company reviews 
each request on a case by case basis following the Article 29 Working 
Party’s guidelines318 which require removal if the content is “inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive . . . in the light of the time 
that has elapsed.”319 Google refused to apply a French order requesting
                                                                                                                     
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192–93 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
MILLS, supra note 257, at 90–91 (analyzing the Yahoo!, Inc. decision during a conflict of laws 
discussion).
312. 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18, 27–30, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-
109034?TID=ihgdqbxnfi.
313. Id. at 27–30. 
314. Id. at 30–33.
315. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 317 (May 13, 2014).
316. Id.
317. Transparency Report: Search Removals Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).
318. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION JUDGMENT ON “GOOGLE SPAIN AND INC. V. AGENCIA 
ESPAÑOLA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS (AEPD) AND MARIO COSTEJA GONZÁLEZ” C-131/12 (2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf.
319. Google Spain SL, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS.
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worldwide removal of the contested data.320 After years in the legal 
system, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is set to hear the case, and 
the outcome will likely determine scope, potency, and longevity of the 
right to be forgotten—whether offending content must be taken down 
only in the requesting country, throughout the EU, or worldwide.321 The 
evolution of European privacy law impacts not only member-nations 
within the EU, but also companies within the United States that engage 
in transatlantic business operations.
B. Transatlantic Data Security Standards
Major changes to European data regulatory structures were voted into 
place in 2016, and are set for implementation in May 2018. Data 
controllers and processors around the globe are currently reconsidering
their data management practices and international data transfers to 
comply with the incoming GDPR322 and EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.323
Traditionally, the Data Protection Directive (the Directive) provided 
standards for all government and private entities that process EU
employee or consumer data, as distinguished from the sector-specific 
approach in the United States.324 The Directive also imposed strict 
requirements on non-EU countries that received personal data from EU
citizens.325 In the event of a data breach, the Directive imposed a duty on 
data processors326 to notify the data controller,327 and the controller to 
communicate the breach to the data subjects without delay.328
Until 2016, the European Commissions permitted U.S. companies to
avoid some of these requirements as long as the companies abided by the 
Safe Harbor Principles.329 After a push for stronger privacy protections 
                                                                                                                     
320. Julia Fioretti, Google Refuses French Order to Apply ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Globally,
REUTERS (July 31, 2015, 5:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/31/us-google-france-
idUSKCN0Q50VP20150731.
321. Alex Hern, ECJ to Rule on Whether ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Can Stretch Beyond EU,
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2017, 5:19 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/20/ecj-
ruling-google-right-to-be-forgotten-beyond-eu-france-data-removed.
322. See Commission Regulation 16/679, arts. 94, 99, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 86, 87 (EU).
323. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES 6
(2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision-annex-
2_en.pdf.
324. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(d), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC).
325. See id. art. 25.
326. ‘“[P]rocessor’ shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other 
body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller . . . .” Id. art. 2(e).
327. The “data controller” is the party primarily responsible for compliance. Id. art. 2(d).
328. Id. arts. 12, 17.
329. The seven Safe Harbor privacy principles are notice, choice, transfer to third parties, 
access, security, data integrity, and enforcement. See Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of 
the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 2012),
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by EU citizens and the courts,330 the Directive was replaced by the GDPR
and the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield replaced Safe Harbor. However, unlike 
the Directive, which allowed each member country to decide how to 
apply standards, the GDPR is law that applies uniformly to all EU 
countries and reaches foreign companies dealing in EU data.331
The GDPR will apply to any company worldwide that processes or
controls personal data332 of an EU resident in connection to (1) offering 
goods or services, or (2) monitoring behavior.333 Before the GDPR comes
into effect on May 25, 2018, companies will need to assess what kinds of 
structural changes will be necessary to ensure compliance, chiefly
providing notice and consent to EU data subjects.334 Most companies will 
need to appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO), and many companies 
will also need to appoint a local representative to be located in the 
European Union.335 If a data breach occurs, DPOs will be required to 
notify a data protection authority within seventy-two hours of the breach,
ideally within twenty-four hours.336 While there will be many issues 
related to jurisdiction, the GDPR permits EU residents to pursue legal 
action against any data processor or controller, including those located in
                                                                                                                     
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/federal-trade-commission-
enforcement-us-eu-us-swiss-safe-harbor.
330. See European Union Press Release No. 117/15, The Court of Justice Declares That the 
Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid ¶¶ 4, 11–12 (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf (finding that 
American companies’ mere compliance with the United States’s Safe Harbor provisions is not, 
by itself, adequate protection in Europe and may still leave these companies exposed to liability). 
331. The CJEU deemed Safe Harbor framework inadequate in the case because the cross-
border transfer of personal data by Facebook did not provide a level of data protection essentially 
equivalent to that of the European Union. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 650; see also John Naughton, Data-Hucksters Beware – Online Privacy 
Is Making a Comeback, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2017, 1:59 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2017/aug/20/data-hucksters-beware-online-privacy-eu-general-data-protection-
regulation.
332. “Personal Data” is defined as any information relating to the subject. Commission 
Regulation 16/679, art. 4(1) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33 (EU).
333. Id. art. 3(2).
334. Id. 
335. Id. arts. 27, 37.
336. Id. art. 33. In addition to data breach requirements under the GDPR, in 2016, the 
European Parliament passed the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, which 
imposes additional reporting requirements on companies following a breach. The NIS Directive 
targets entities that provide essential services, such as the energy, health, finance, and 
transportation sectors, and digital service providers. Council Directive 16/1148, arts. 4(4), 5(2), 
2016 O.J. (L 194) 1, 13, 14 (EU). Similar to the GDPR, the NIS Directive applies to companies 
outside of the European Union if the company offers services within the European Union. Id. art. 
18. If a company falls within one of the regulated sectors and is breached, the company is then 
required to notify the relevant authorities regardless of whether the breach exposed personal data. 
Id. arts. 14, 16.
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the United States, alleged to be in violation of the GDPR.337
Administrative fines for violations of the GDPR will operate in a two-
tiered system, with the most egregious data breaches incurring fines of 
up to 4% of global annual turnover—up to €20 million.338 Factors for 
determining the fine include, but are not limited to, the nature of 
infringement, intentionality or negligence, mitigating factors taken by the 
data controller, and nature of the personal data.339
The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield will protect personal data in transfers 
between EU residents and U.S. companies, while encouraging the flow 
of data between U.S. companies and the European Union.340 The FTC 
will monitor U.S. companies subject to the Privacy Shield stateside.341
The Privacy Shield protects personal data by imposing requirements on 
organizations for their data collection, management, and consumer 
transparency practices.342 U.S. companies must provide notice to EU data 
subjects on data use and recourse available, provide choice of opt-out of 
data collection or opt-in for sharing sensitive data,343 and must take 
reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect personal data 
from “loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and 
destruction, taking into due account the risks involved in the processing 
and the nature of the personal data.”344 Consistent with principles of data 
minimization, companies must limit collection of personal data to what 
is relevant to the purpose.345 Companies must also allow data subjects 
access to their own data and the ability to correct or amend it where 
reasonable, and must make available independent recourse mechanisms 
in the event of breach.346 Additionally, companies must limit data use and 
transfers to third parties consistent with purpose provided in notice, and 
are accountable for third-party organizations receiving data transfers, 
                                                                                                                     
337. Commission Regulation 16/679, art. 79, at 80.
338. Kuan Hon, GDPR: Potential Fines for Data Security Breaches More Severe for Data 
Controllers Than Processors, REGISTER (May 12, 2016, 8:33 AM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/05/12/gdpr_potential_fines_for_data_security_breaches_mor
e_severe_for_data_controllers_than_processors_says_expert/.
339. Commission Regulation 16/679, art. 83, at 82.
340. See W. Gregory Voss, The Future of Transatlantic Data Flows: Privacy Shield or 
Bust?, 19 J. INTERNET L. 1, 10 (2016).
341. European Commission Press Release MEMO/16/434, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: 
Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 29, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-
434_en.htm.
342. See id.
343. Sensitive data is not specifically defined but generally includes personal data about 
medical history, health, race or ethnic origin, political, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade 
union membership, or sex life. Voss, supra note 340, at 9.
344. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 323, at 6.
345. See Voss, supra note 340, at 13.
346. See id.
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ensuring the third party takes steps to comply with the Privacy Shield.347
U.S. companies can self-certify that they abide by EU data privacy 
standards, which track the seven principles established in the Directive.348
VI. RESPONSES TO DATA BREACHES AND THE FUTURE OF DATA BREACH 
LAW AND POLICY
The specific responses to a data breach must be rapid and organized. 
Of the two classes of victims affected—individuals and the corporate 
entities that hold these individuals’ private information?the corporations 
have the principal duty to maintain security of individuals’ information.
A. The Corporation 
Corporations have the duty and the opportunity to reduce their 
exposure to harmful breaches and reduce the damage to the individuals 
whose information they hold. Any entity that possesses information—
whether it be sensitive corporate information or the personal information 
of customers and/or employees—should, at a minimum, implement the 
following practices: 
1. monitor the guidance and rules provided by the federal and state 
agencies regulating their industry, including the guidance 
promulgated within enforcement actions, presentations, and 
agency editorials or blog posts; 
2. apply up-to-date technical standards, such as the NIST industry 
standards;
3. develop and adopt adequate data collection and security plans that 
are constantly reviewed against regulatory requirements and 
actions at both the state and federal level; and 
4. repeatedly test all data collection and security plans.
Essentially, corporations must heed the FTC’s advice by starting and 
sticking with security.349 To build an even stronger program, corporations 
should conduct internal investigations that test their own policies. 
Supervisors can test their employees with benign spear phishing exercises 
in order to ensure that every employee is equipped to handle malicious 
attacks. Corporate counsel can draft monthly data security reminders and 
run tabletop exercises that simulate a breach experience. These 
                                                                                                                     
347. See id. at 15.
348. The Framework’s seven privacy principles are notice, choice, accountability for onward 
transfer, security, data integrity and purpose limitation, access, and recourse. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, supra note 323, at 4–6.
349. See supra notes 128, 130 and accompanying text. 
54
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/3
2017] PRIVACY, MASS INTRUSION, AND THE MODERN DATA BREACH 825
evaluations should occur as frequently as possible with a goal of constant 
improvement.
Once a breach occurs, the breached entity is in crisis mode but should 
have a plan to follow and follow quickly. The corporation or breached 
entity must assess the problem, issue internal notifications, freeze all 
evidence surrounding the breach, perform its legal obligations to affected 
individuals based on applicable law, and then pursue its legal remedies, 
some of which might require mounting defenses against the individuals 
its policies were designed to protect. Some of these responses may 
include offensive legal actions against negligent providers or others who 
caused the breach. As demonstrated by the graphic below, the legal 
landscape is treacherous.350
The landscape can become even more treacherous if the breach 
reaches valuable commercial information. The corporate entity must be 
ready to enjoin or, at the least, reduce publication in the media and online. 
The loss of trade secret status because of predictable republication in the 
current digital age seems to be a seriously harsh penalty if the corporation 
made all efforts to sustain confidentiality of the information. The legal 
and practical problem is that the republishers may be clueless and 
blameless, only repeating what they see posted online. However, the 
harm to the corporation is the same as if the data were stolen and
distributed by corporate espionage.
But the corporation must make an effort to defend valuable trade 
secrets. If a trade secret has been widely republished at no fault of the 
                                                                                                                     
350. Pedro Allende, Data Security Law: Foundations, Workshop Presentation at the Privacy 
+ Security Forum (Oct. 24, 2016) (on file with authors).
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trade secret holder and has subsequently lost trade secret status under 
UTSA, in lieu of an injunction prohibiting all publication by any 
publisher, courts could instead order a targeted delisting of the trade 
secret from search engines. This type of search engine takedown is the 
method utilized by the European Union’s right to be forgotten policy.351
This policy reflects the logic used in “search engine optimization,” which 
focuses on the primary sources used to research information or 
individuals—i.e., the principal search engines such as Google, Yahoo, or 
Bing.352 While this proposal has less First Amendment concerns than an 
all-encompassing injunction on the publication of information, it still 
may not provide the relief that many trade secret holders seek.
Another proposed remedy to this situation is a takedown system akin 
to that of intellectual property takedowns under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA). The DMCA353 has worked to enable the 
removal of information located on ISPs through specific notice. The same 
type of process could work for trade secrets, and trade secret scholars 
have long advocated for an improved trade secret takedown process 
modeled after the DMCA.354 One such suggestion would require ISPs to 
remove the publication of alleged misappropriated trade secrets from 
their site within a few hours after being notified of the infringing 
material.355 Then, the original complainant would have a week to a file 
an official complaint with the court.356 The takedown notice would be 
accompanied by a bond or fee to minimize potential frivolous 
complaints.357 Some First Amendment concerns would be alleviated by 
an exception for established news organizations, which would exempt 
such sites from the accelerated takedown process altogether.358 While 
such a process may limit the digital republication of valuable information, 
it does not necessarily escape the continuing criticisms lodged against the 
DMCA. Just as the DMCA suffers from the lack of a take-down-and-
                                                                                                                     
351. See supra text accompanying notes 315–17.
352. See What Is SEO / Search Engine Optimization?, SEARCH ENGINE LAND,
http://searchengineland.com/guide/what-is-seo (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
353. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012). Section 512 of the DMCA requires that the takedown 
request be in writing, be signed by the copyright owner or agent, identify the infringed work, 
identify the material that is infringing the work, include contact information for the copyright 
owner, have a statement of good faith and accuracy, and have a statement that the complaining 
party is authorized to proceed in the takedown request. See id.
354. See Elizabeth Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet, 2007 
WIS. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2007).
355. Id. at 1061–62. 
356. See id. at 1062.
357. Id. at 1063. 
358. Id. at 1065–66, 1071–84.
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stay-down approach,359 a trade secret takedown process could become 
unmanageable if the online posting frenzy has already started. Further, 
the First Amendment concerns are not completely solved by the 
established media exception, especially considering that what constitutes 
media and public interest changes and expands every day. 
Regardless, creating an effective trade secret takedown process is 
important because it directly relates to the impact of removing 
information from the internet—a critical problem that has yet to be 
overcome in current data breaches. Pragmatically, data breaches are 
going to deal with information that is somehow made available to 
unauthorized sources. It may be on the dark web, as in the Ashley 
Madison breach;360 it may be in the hands of journalists, as in the HSBC 
breach;361 or it may be published on a website, as in the Sony breach.362
In all of these cases, a major issue facing companies is preventing further 
republication after an initial criminal breach, which commonly discloses 
important trade secrets as well as intrusive personal disclosures that affect 
individuals. 
B. The Individual 
Individuals, like corporations, face numerous hurdles when preparing 
for and responding to a data breach. Both also face massive consequences 
if a breach occurs, but the landscape for individuals is significantly less 
defined. The central difficulties that individuals must learn to navigate 
fall primarily into two categories:
1. Understanding and implementing the necessary steps to 
protect against harm caused by data breaches; and
2. Determining whether to pursue legal action.
For many practitioners, the most pressing issues for affected 
individuals revolve around the efficacy of legal action. However, 
realistically, most individuals are rightfully consumed with the task of
protecting themselves before and immediately in the aftermath of the
breach.  Simply put, they cannot wait for the legal system to provide them
                                                                                                                     
359. Copyright holders are limited in only targeting the takedown of infringing material 
posted by a particular user on a specific website. There is no blanket takedown process for 
copyrighted material posted by multiple users on multiple websites, thus creating an excruciating 
process comparable to the children’s game Whack-A-Mole. See Stephen Carlisle, DMCA 
“Takedown” Notices: Why “Takedown” Should Become “Take Down and Stay Down” and Why 
It’s Good for Everyone, NOVA SE. U. (July 23, 2014), http://copyright.nova.edu/dmca-takedown-
notices/.
360. See supra Subsection I.B.6.
361. See supra Subsection I.B.5.
362. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
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with adequate relief.  Instead, individuals must adopt their own security 
measures to better protect themselves against identity theft and other 
post-breach consequences. While corporations and courts drag their feet, 
individuals can implement simple techniques, such as the use of complex 
and unique passwords, to better secure their digital activities. Shifting 
these responsibilities to the individual should not be the ultimate solution, 
but adopting stronger personal security measure is a practice, and it could 
mean the difference between a breach ruining a life or being a minor 
inconvenience.  
Of course, individuals should also have the opportunity to pursue 
legal remedies by seeking relief in tort, breach of contract, or through 
statutory damages. Whether through statutory claims such as the FCRA 
claim in Spokeo363 or a negligence complaint, it is critical that plaintiffs 
employ creative legal strategies in order to overcome the barriers to relief 
from the effects of data breaches. Although there have been notable 
successes for individuals in class action litigation like the Target
action,364 and in cases where negligence of the breached entity is clear,
barriers such as standing and First Amendment protections for 
republication create major hurdles to an individual’s relief. 
In the long term, cutting-edge litigation and serious policy reform can 
provide more options for innocent victims of the mass privacy intrusions 
known as data breaches. Courts must begin to better value the potentially 
intrusive nature of personal data disclosures and more willing to view a 
wider range of remedies.  
C. The Future
The current society collects and exposes massive amounts of data 
continually. These collections contain sensitive and personal information.  
Reflecting this trend, the Supreme Court recognized the intrusiveness of 
observing personal cell phone data in the Fourth Amendment context. 
The Court stated that the warrantless search of the data contained on a 
cell phone may be even more intrusive than the search of a home.365 In 
his reasoning, Chief Justice John Roberts acknowledged the high value 
of protecting private digital information in the search and seizure and
public safety realm.366 Just as public safety concerns compete with 
privacy rights, the right to privacy competes with the First Amendment 
right to publish information. The modern data breach is facilitating a mass 
intrusion on corporate confidentiality and individual privacy. 
                                                                                                                     
363. See supra notes 264–71 and accompanying text.
364. See Stempel & Bose, supra note 37.  
365. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
366. See id. at 2494–95.
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Accordingly, the right of corporate trade secrets and individual’s 
confidentiality must be protected in a reliable way. Further, individual 
dignity and privacy must prevail. The EU approach to balancing the harm 
to individual dignity against the value of public disclosure is workable 
and can be supported by the logic of Bartnicki.367
Just as the republication of commercially valuable data should not be 
automatically protected speech, neither should the breaches of individual 
privacy by third parties or republishers of breached information. Simply 
because an individual has revealed sensitive information to another does 
not mean the person abandoned all privacy interests. 
In the Fourth Amendment context, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
eloquently expressed the need for privacy rights when information has 
been disclosed to third parties. In a data breach context, the data given to 
a website, retailer, medical provider, or financial institution should not be 
freely distributed by third parties after a breach makes that information 
available. As Justice Sotomayor said, “[I]t may be necessary to reconsider 
the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill 
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.”368
Certainly, the mere disclosure to a third party for routine life tasks 
cannot be viewed as consent for the republication of information 
wrongfully obtained from a data breach from that third party. That is 
exactly the circumstance when a blogger or media outlet republishes 
private information posted on the web by a hacker. 
Victims, whether corporate or individual, must also contend with the 
plaintiff’s paradox or what others have termed the “Streisand Effect”369:
litigation to vindicate privacy rights risks exposure to greater attention to 
the embarrassing slanderous, intimate, commercially sensitive, or
invasive information.370 Sometimes the costs of republicizing the events 
of the breach are worse than simply allowing it to disappear into the 
                                                                                                                     
367. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
368. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted).
369. See T.C., What Is the Streisand Effect?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:50 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-what-
streisand-effect.
370. For example, see CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 [2] 
(Eng.), regarding the “super injunction” sought by famous soccer player Ryan Giggs to prohibit 
the media from releasing not only information about his extramarital affair, but also his identity 
in seeking the injunction. Ultimately the injunction became useless because social media 
worldwide disclosed Giggs’s identity.
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perpetual clamor of the modern media.371 So far, corporate suits to 
vindicate privacy in the form of property rights such as trade secrets have 
been successful.372 Individuals who brought lawsuits to vindicate 
personal privacy have seen less success, but this precedent need not 
dictate the future; creative use of the privacy torts may be the most 
workable vehicle moving forward. Responding to and preventing 
damages from data breaches will require changes in policy and creative 
litigation strategies. 
Policy advancements, particularly by the FTC, have made great leaps 
in protecting individual privacy and raising the standards for sensitive 
data protection. However, a significant hurdle left to clear is avoiding or 
mitigating harmful republication. The European Union has provided a 
useful model for reform in this arena by recognizing the importance of 
privacy as personal dignity. A logical extension of the Bartnicki
framework in the United States leads to the inexorable conclusion that 
the republication of private facts cannot automatically be immune from
liability. New legislation seeking to limit the republication of both 
valuable commercial information and individuals’ private information 
could codify this Bartnicki extension and recognize the growing value of 
modern privacy. Either legislation or litigation must be able to thread the 
First Amendment needle to provide protection to corporations and 
individuals. Until law and policy changes, the epidemic of data breaches 
will continue to cause substantial harm to breached corporations and to 
create mass privacy intrusions on innocent individuals.
                                                                                                                     
371. Individual victims seeking anonymity while pursuing post-breach remedies may be 
denied such privacy. See Emily Fiend, Ashley Madison User Must Reveal Real Name in Breach 
Suit, LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/737739/ashley-
madison-user-must-reveal-real-name-in-breach-suit (describing how U.S. District Court Judge 
James M. Moody, Jr. required the anonymous Ashley Madison user leading the class action to 
reveal his name instead of filing under an alias).
372. E.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 13–19 (Cal. 2003). 
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